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COMMENT
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT COERCES GROUPS TO
ACCEPT MEMBERS THEY DO NOT WANT:
ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACY AS A REMEDY
Michael Hastings Wendt'
I. INTRODUCTION

Step into the shoes of the Feminist Student Society for Future Attorneys,
which meets in a classroom during after-school hours in a state university
law school. This feminist society only admits females as members and only
allows females to hold officer positions. Imagine that a fellow male
classmate is deeply disheartened because he cannot join this illustrious
society. Now the feminist society decides to extend an olive branch to this
male student and allow him to attend some of their general meetings as a
fellow guest. Nevertheless, he is still dissatisfied that he cannot achieve a
more active role in the society. Ever since childhood, this male student has
championed the feminist cause. He gracefully petitions the society to grant
him an exception and admit him as a member with the corollary right to
run for an officer position. The feminist society refuses to grant his petition.
The male student complains to the law school and asserts that the feminist
society has violated the law school's nondiscrimination policy because it has
discriminated on the basis of gender. The law school enforces the policy by
ordering the feminist society to open its doors to male members and
officers or else forfeit its status as an official school club. The feminist
society, alleging a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom
of association, brings and subsequently loses a 42 U.S.C § 19831 action
against the law school.

t Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2014); B.S., Government, summa cum laude, Liberty
University (2011).
1. The statute, in relevant part, says:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
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Although the preceding scenario may sound absurd, similar scenarios
have occurred in cases before the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Courts of Appeals, and the United States District Courts throughout
the country. A government entity can use its nondiscrimination policy to
coerce a private group, which gathers on property that the government has
opened up to the public for a limited purpose, to accept new members that
the group does not want.2 The United States Courts of Appeals are split on
how to resolve this issue.' The Seventh Circuit holds that nondiscrimination
policies cannot be used to exclude expressive associations from limited
public fora who discriminate based on membership.' The Second Circuit,
Ninth Circuit, and a district court within the Eleventh Circuit disagree.' A
district court within the Third Circuit could resolve this issue either way,
depending on the facts of the case.'
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to directly resolve
this issue in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,' but declined to do so. In
Martinez, a state university initially used its nondiscrimination policy to bar
a student religious society from official recognition as a club; however, the
university subsequently invented an all-comers policy during the course of
litigation.' The Court resolved Martinez solely based on the all-comers
policy and not the nondiscrimination policy.' Nevertheless, more recent
lower court decisions have interpreted the Martinez opinion to extend to
nondiscrimination policies as well.'o
Part II of this Comment examines the origins and evolution of freedom
of association, the impact of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, and the
circuit split on whether the government can use a nondiscrimination policy
to coerce groups that meet on limited or nonpublic fora to include persons
they wish to exclude.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). For an excellent treatise on § 1983 and how to litigate constitutional
rights, see generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:

THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2010).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See discussion infra, Parts II.D-E.
See discussion infra, Part II.E.
See discussion infra, Part II.E.3.
See discussion infra, Parts II.E.1, 4, & 5.
See discussion infra, Part II.E.2.
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
See discussion infra, Part II.D
Id.
See discussion infra, Part II.E.4.
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Part III of this Comment details how the government infringes on the
constitutional right of groups to associate when it attempts to force those
groups to be inclusive of nonmembers. It also describes how the current
framework that courts use to analyze freedom of association cases is
inadequate to resolve these types of fringe cases and to protect groups from
government incursions through nondiscrimination policies. Although, in
the abstract, there is nothing wrong with a nondiscrimination policy, this
Comment will show that its wrongful use can lead to the diminution of
constitutional freedom.
Part IV of this Comment proposes the concept of associational privacy as
a modification to the current framework that courts use to analyze freedom
of association cases to resolve the problem created by government
nondiscrimination policies. There was a time when the Court implicitly
assumed that there is a right to associational privacy." Unfortunately, the
Court's subsequent decisions have both greatly limited the extent of
associational privacy and usually ignored it.'2 A closer look at associational
privacy will reinvigorate neglected constitutional freedoms and add an extra
layer of protection to prevent the government from forcing private groups
that meet on government property to accept outsiders as new members that
the group does not want.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Origins of Freedom ofAssociation
Both courts and scholars attribute the origins of freedom of association
to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.13 In Patterson, the Alabama
attorney general attempted to stop the NAACP from conducting its
activities in Alabama, unless the NAACP registered itself as a foreign
corporation." The State moved for and the trial court ordered the NAACP
to produce a number of documents, including the organization's
membership lists." The Court held that the forced disclosure of the
11. See discussion infra, Parts II.A, III.C.
12. See discussion infra, Part III.C.
13. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 479
(10th Cir. 2011); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 580 (2013); John D. Inazu, The
Strange Origins of the ConstitutionalRight ofAssociation, 77 TENN. L. REv. 485, 506 (2010).
14. Patterson,357 U.S. at 452.
15. Id. at 453.
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membership lists was an unjustified violation of freedom of association."
To force the NAACP to disclose their membership lists would significantly
damage the NAACP's efforts to advocate their beliefs because it would
encourage current members to withdraw and discourage others from
joining it." The Court recognized that an individual's choice to associate
with a group and advocate a point of view grows out of a "close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly" and is an "inseparable aspect
of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" More importantly, the Court characterized the freedom to
associate as a broad and essential right that encompassed both the "freedom
to associate and privacy in one's associations."
The right to associate goes beyond the mere right of individuals to
coalesce together in groups; the right also protects the privacy of those
groups.20 In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee," a
committee investigated the NAACP for purportedly questionable activities
and ordered the organization's president to disclose its lists of members and
contributors.22 The Court made it emphatically clear that the right also
encompassed an associational right to privacy, especially as it pertains to an

16. Id. at 466.
17. Id. at 462-63. In fact, the Court stated that the State's forced disclosure of the
membership lists was such a significant deprivation of rights that it was analogous to "[a]
requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying
arm-bands . . . ."Id. at 462.
18. Id. at 460.
19. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Patterson,
357 U.S. at 462; In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 479 (10th
Cir. 2011).
21. Gibson, 372 U.S. 539.
22. Id. at 540, 542. The investigation concerned the following:
"[A]ctivities of various organizations which have been or are presently
operating in this State in the fields of, first, race relations; second, the coercive
reform of social and educational practices and mores by litigation and
pressured administrative action; third, of labor; fourth, of education; fifth, and
other vital phases of life in this State." The chairman also stated that the inquiry
would be directed to Communists and Communist activities, including
infiltration of Communists into organizations operating in the described fields.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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organization's membership lists. 2 3 The right to associate freely is
"fundamental and highly prized, and 'need[s] breathing space to survive."' 24
Therefore, the right must be "'protected not only against heavy-handed
frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental
interference.' 2 5 Here, the committee failed to demonstrate that the NAACP
posed a threat to the State or that it engaged in subversive activities, even if
some of its members happened to also be members of other unpopular
groups, such as the Communists.26 The mere fact that several members held
an unpopular philosophy did not justify the committee's intrusion into the
NAACP's associational privacy.27
Although both Pattersonand Gibson exemplify the origins of the right to
associate, these cases neither defined its precise boundaries nor attempted
to promulgate a framework for analyzing this right. Rather, they left the
right open to be defined on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, both cases
clearly describe this fundamental right as also encompassing a substantial
privacy interest in a person's associations. 28 Twenty-six years after
Patterson, a significant landmark case would forever alter how courts
analyze a person's right to associate.
B. Two Categoriesof Freedom ofAssociation
Roberts v. United States Jaycees" is the earliest case to explicitly outline a
framework to analyze freedom of association claims.30 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court," stated that all of the previous freedom of association
cases fell within one of two lines of cases.32 The first line "protects against
unjustified government interference with an individual's choice to enter
23. Id. at 544, 555. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (reaffirming that "compelled disclosure
has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights").
24. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 544 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
25. Id. (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (emphasis added)).
26. Id. at 554-55. Nevertheless, the government may be justified in compelling a group to
disclose its membership lists if the group was an imminent threat to national security. See Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81 (1959) (holding that "governmental interest in self-preservation is
sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in associational privacy...
27. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 555-56.
28. Id. at 555; NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
29. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
30. Inazu, supra note 13, at 558.
31. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
32. Id. at 617-18.
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into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships."" This line of
cases embodies certain fundamental rights that are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The second line protects
"the freedom of individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in
protected speech or religious activities."" This line pertains to rights that
are protected by the First Amendment.36
Nevertheless, Roberts departed from the original freedom of association
cases because it divided associational protection based on whether and
where the claim fell within the framework." This means that some claims,
such as an allegation of government interference with a deeply personal
relationship, may be entitled to more constitutional protection than others,
such as an allegation of government violation of associational expression."
In effect, the Roberts framework greatly limited freedom of association
claims to two categories: intimate association and expressive association."
1. Intimate Association
Intimate association is the fundamental right to "enter into and maintain
certain intimate human relationships" without interference from the

33. Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987) (citing
Roberts, 468 U.S. 609).
34. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958).
35. Duarte,481 U.S. at 544 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618).
36. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. Freedom of association is an implied right from the First
Amendment:
The [First] Amendment restricts government from interfering with religious
freedom and free press, of course. But it also restricts government from
interfering with rights of assembly and grievance. From these express freedoms,
the Supreme Court has abstracted what is often termed a right of free
association, meaning a right to form and belong to groups with social, political,
or religious purposes, including groups that may be critical of government.
Anita L. Allen, Symposium, Privacy JurisprudenceAs an Instrument of Social Change First
Amendment Privacy and the Battlefor ProgressivelyLiberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J.CONST.
L. 885, 899 (2012).
37. Inazu, supra note 13, at 558-59; see Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment are inseparable components that comprise
the right to associate).
38. See Inazu, supra note 13, at 558-59; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621, 623.
39. See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 544; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 581 (2013).
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government.40 The Court has never determined the precise boundaries of
what constitutes an intimate association.4 1 Nevertheless, familial
relationships exemplify the heart of intimate associations.4 2 Although
intimate associations can occur outside of a familial relationship, these
associations, by analogy, must include the key characteristics of a familial
relationship.
This requires "a careful assessment of where that
relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most
intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.""
Like familial relationships, these non-familial intimate relationships are
characterized by their "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship."" Furthermore, intimate associations are

40. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
[T]here has been some debate as to the source of the right to intimate or
familial association. Some authority holds that the freedom of intimate
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty
under the due process clauses. Other authority holds that relationships that
exemplify intimate associations are protected by the First Amendment.
16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 581 (2013) (footnotes omitted); compare Montgomery
v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that intimate association is protected
by the due process clauses), with Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 44 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
intimate association is protected by the First Amendment).
41. Duarte,481 U.S. at 545-46.
42. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. Several lower courts have subsequently taken a broad
view on what constitutes interference with an intimate familial association. See Jones v. Bay
Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 12-CV-4051 JS GRB, 2013 WL 2316643, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
May 28, 2013) (denying, in part, a public school's motion to dismiss because the school's
retaliation against the plaintiff, by suspending his daughter, constituted an infringement on
the plaintiff-daughter intimate association); D.M. v. Cnty. of Berks, No. 12-6762, 2013 WL
1031824, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2013) (holding that parents stated a claim a for relief for
infringement of intimate association, when social workers and police entered the parents'
home to take custody of their daughter and to forbid them from communicating with their
daughter, even though there was no evidence of suspected child abuse); but see Bassett v.
Snyder, No. 12-10038, 2013 WL 3285111, at *13 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2013) (holding that
while a homosexual couple was an intimate association, a state's ban on providing state
benefits to the cohabitants of public employees did not interfere with the couple's intimate
relationship).
43. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
44. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545-46 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). "In addition, [some]
courts have extended protection to personal friendships and non-marital romantic
relationships." U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 598 (6th Cir. 2013).
45. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
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characterized by much more than a "special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs;" they also must involve the deeply personal facets
of each individual's life within the group camaraderie as well as a resolute
commitment to the group."6
46. Id. at 620. The courts tend to narrowly construe what constitutes an intimate
association. Generally, the following relationships do not constitute an intimate association:
doctor-patient relationships; customer relationships with health insurance companies;
school classmate relationships; sports team relationships; employer-employee relationships;
restaurant owners-customer relationships; landlord-tenant relationships; business
relationships; coworker relationships; escort service-client relationships; adulterous
relationships; attenuated relationships with in-laws; attenuated relationships within college
fraternities; attenuated friendships; recreational dancing; protesting; and private clubs where
the sole purpose is to drink or take recreational drugs. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 24 (1989) ("It is clear beyond cavil that dance-hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on
any given night, are not engaged in the sort of 'intimate human relationships' referred to in
Roberts."); U.S. Citizens Ass'n, 705 F.3d at 598 ("[Medical patients typically do not share
'deep attachments and commitments' with physicians, nor do patients and physicians
typically share a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs.") (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Id. at 599 ("[Rlelationships with large business enterprises like
health insurance companies do not qualify as intimate associations warranting constitutional
protection."); Michaelidis v. Berry, 502 F. App'x 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
restaurant owners' "relationships with their landlords, their restaurant customers, and their
employees are not sufficiently intimate to implicate this protection" because they are not
analogous to "the sort of close family relationships recognized as intimate relationships
warranting constitutional protection"); Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that an adulterous relationship is not a protected intimate association based
on the rationale that it is antithetical to marriage and family); Gary v. City of Warner Robins,
311 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no generalized right to associate in alcoholpurveying establishments with other adults."); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a college fraternity was not an
intimate association based on its "size, membership criteria, and openness to the public");
Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 996 (2d Cir. 1997)
("[P]ure business relationships with organized crime members fall outside the protected
sphere [of intimate association]."); Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 799 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that associating "conspicuously with others for the purpose of protesting allegedly
discriminatory practices" is not an intimate association); Watson v. Fraternal Order of
Eagles, 915 F.2d 235, 244 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a private drinking club was not an
intimate association); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that a woman's association with her brother-in-law was not an intimate
association); IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cnty., 836 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
client-escort relationship is not an intimate association, in part, because "the relationship
between a client and his or her paid companion may well be the antithesis of the highly
personal bonds protected by the fourteenth amendment"); Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 224 (M.D. Pa. 2012), affd, No. 12-3400, 2013 WL 3481737 (3d Cir. June 24,
2013) (holding that coworkers are not an intimate association); Kirby v. Loyalsock Twp. Sch.
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Roberts was the first case to apply this criteria regarding intimate
association. Roberts involved a suit in Minnesota against the Jaycees, an allmale civic organization." Although the Jaycees reserved full membership to
young men, they permitted women to join as nonvoting members."
Nevertheless, the Jaycees prohibited women from both holding office in the
Jaycees organization and from attending leadership-training activities." The
State contended that the Jaycees violated the State's public accommodations
law.so The Court unequivocally held that the State could require the Jaycees
Dist., 837 F. Supp. 2d 467, 474-75 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that a "Plaintiffs friendships
with her classmates and basketball teammates are legally insufficient to be protected by the
First Amendment" because '"[t]he Constitution does not recognize a generalized right of
social association."') (quoting Sanitation and Recycling Inds. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d
985, 996 (2d Cir.1997)); Taverns for Tots, Inc. v. City of Toledo, 341 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that a tavern organization was not an intimate association
because it was "not small in size" and there was. nothing "selective about becoming a
member") (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reno v. Metro. Transit Auth., 977 F. Supp.
812, 825 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that friendships are generally not an intimate association);
Semaphore Entm't Grp. Sports Corp. v. Gonzalez, 919 F. Supp. 543, 550 n.4 (D.P.R. 1996)
(stating that participation in a martial artist competition, "like the association of dancers or
businessmen[,]" is not an intimate association). But see Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a housing
roommate is an intimate association because "[a] side from immediate family or a romantic
partner, it's hard to imagine a relationship more intimate than that between roommates, who
share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, even bedrooms"); Kicklighter v.
Evans Cnty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 720 (S.D. Ga. 1997) ('[D]ating' is associational
activity protected by the First Amendment.") (citing Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544
(11th Cir. 1984)), affd sub nom. Kicklighter v. Evans Cnty. Sch., 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir.
1998).
47. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612. The purpose of the Jaycees was
[T]o pursue "such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and
foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the
United States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such
organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a
supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent
participation by young men in the affairs of their community, state and nation,
and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all
nations."
Id. at 612-13.
48. Id. at 613-14.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 615-16. The Minnesota public accommodations law stated that "[iut is an
unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
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to accept female members because the State had a compelling interest in
ending gender discrimination.'
The Jaycees did not constitute an intimate association because they were
"large and basically unselective groups."" Some local Jaycees chapters had
more than four hundred members and normally never denied any applicant
admission, except for those who did not meet the Jaycees's age or gender
requirements.53 In fact, even nonmembers, including women, typically
participated in several of the Jaycees's significant activities.' Therefore, the
Jaycees appeared to be a mere group of strangers and did not relate to each
other in a way that is analogous to a familial relationship."
Another landmark case that addressed intimate association was Board of
Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte.6 In this case, a
California "Rotary Club"" sought to enjoin its parent organization from
enforcing its constitution, which barred women from official membership
in the organization." The parent organization argued that it excluded
women from membership for the purpose of promoting fellowship among
professional men but that it still allowed women to participate in some of its
club activities." The California Court of Appeal held that the club
resembled a business organization and violated the state's public

accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
at 615.
51. Id. at 624,626.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Id.
54. Id. On this regard, the Court especially noted that:
In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the
memberships and boards of directors of both chapters include a substantial
proportion of women. As a result, the two chapters have been in violation of
the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years.
Id. at 614.
55. Id. at 621.
56. Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'lv. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
57. Generally, the Rotary clubs embodied "an organization of business and professional
men united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards
in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Id. at 539.
58. Id. at 541-42.
59. Id. at 541.
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accommodations law.o The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court's decision but analyzed it under the Roberts framework."
Applying the Roberts framework, the Court held that the Rotary Club did
not constitute an intimate association because of its size, its nonselectivity
of its members, and its activities that were conducted in the presence of
nonmembers.62 The Court reasoned that the clubs, in general, ranged from
twenty to nine hundred members.63 Furthermore, the clubs were instructed
to be as inclusive as possible of men to form a crossover between diverse
businesses and professional networks." "Such an inclusive fellowship for
service based on diversity of interest ... however beneficial to the members
and to those they serve, does not suggest the kind of private or personal
relationship to which we have accorded protection under the First
Amendment."65 Finally, the willingness of the clubs to conduct their
activities in front of strangers was so prevalent that it was analogous to
having their "windows and doors open to the whole world."'
Intimate association includes our most personal and private relationships
in either one-on-one relationships or very small groups. 6' A significant
impact of the Roberts and Duarte cases is that a person's right to privacy
within his associations is now generally analyzed as a form of intimate
association.6 8 The Court generally presumes that larger groups lack the
characteristics of an intimate association.' 9 Therefore, if a larger group

60. Id. at 542. The California public accommodations law stated: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id.
at 541 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 544-45.
62. Id. at 546-47. Although Duarte primarily dealt with intimate association, the Court
also briefly addressed and dispensed with the Rotary Club's expressive association claim. Id.
at 548-49. The Court held that there was no infringement on the club's expressive
association, and even if there was a burden, the State had a compelling interest to eliminate
gender discrimination. Id.
63. Id. at 546.
64. Id. at 546-47.
65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 545; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
68. Duarte,481 U.S. at 545-46.
69. Id. at 546-47; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-2 1.
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wishes to claim the protection afforded by the right to associate, it must
demonstrate that it is an expressive association.o
2.

Expressive Association

Expressive association is the right of groups of citizens to associate
together to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment,
including those activities it explicitly mentions, such as "speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."" Those
explicit rights imply "a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends."7 2 Nevertheless, a citizen's right to expressive
70. Duarte,481 U.S. at 544-46; see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621-22.
71. Id. at 618. For an excellent survey of the various types of expressive association, see
generally Randall P. Bezanson et al., Mapping the Forms of Expressive Association, 40 PEPP. L.
REv. 23 (2012).
72. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at
622). "It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes-for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping
mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment." City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). Generally, the following
groups and activities do not constitute an expressive association: recreational dancing;
escort-services; associations with people of the same age group; associations of two or more
persons who merely hold common beliefs; mere casual conversations between friends and
acquaintances; participation in competitions; purely social fraternities; purely recreational
festivals; mere cordial gatherings of smokers; gatherings of motorcyclists and bicyclists that
convey no particularized message; wedding receptions; a single individual proselytizing
another; sports teams; tavern owners and clients. Id. at 24 (holding that recreational dancing
is not an expressive association because those "who congregate each night at ... [a] dance
hall are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business
establishment."); URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)
(holding that the categories of intimate and expressive association "cannot be stretched to
form a generic right to mix and mingle [or] to sanctify a generalized 'right to congregate and
socialize."'); Smith v. City of Lebanon, 387 F. App'x 186, 188 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
tavern owner and her clients were not an expressive association); Club Retro, L.L.C. v.
Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 211 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that expressive association "does not
protect chance encounters at a dance club that contain no element of expression."); Schultz
v. Wilson, 304 F. App'x 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a wedding reception was not an
expressive association); S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., 372 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that "purely recreational" activities, "such as some carnivals, festivals, and
exhibitions[,]" are not expressive associations); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442-43 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a college fraternity "was not a
constitutionally protected expressive association because it was essentially a social
organization."); Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1120 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he right to
expressive association 'is not implicated when two persons simply hold common beliefs or
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even when those different person[s] express those common beliefs-they must join together
'for the purpose of expressing those shared views."') (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted), vacated, 511 U.S. 661, 681-82 (1994) (vacating the judgment of the appeals
court, which had granted a motion for summary judgment, because the plaintiff raised a
genuine issue of material fact on whether her right to free speech was violated); Conti v. City
of Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a person's association with
people of a particular age group, without more, is not an expressive association); IDK, Inc. v.
Clark Cnty., 836 F.2d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an escort service is not an
expressive association because it "cannot claim that [its] expression constitutes anything but
an incidental aspect of their commercial activity."); Watchtower Bible Tract Soc. of New
York, Inc. v. Sanchez-Ramos, 647 F. Supp. 2d 103, 120 (D.P.R. 2009) (holding that several
Jehovah's Witnesses, who independently and not as a group, attempted to proselytize
nonmembers within an urbanization were not an expressive association), affd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Sagardia De
Jesus, 634 F.3d 3, 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (the appeals court vacated the district court's order to
deny declaratory and injunctive relief on the plaintiffs as-applied challenge regarding their
free speech claims); Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1217, 1219 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (holding that a group of motorcyclists, who wore vests at a festival, was not an
expressive association because it was "unclear what, if any, particularizedmessage Plaintiffs
intended to convey."), affd, 484 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007), and affd sub nom. Villegas v.
Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008); Taverns for Tots, Inc. v. City of
Toledo, 341 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (stating that a mere group of smokers in
a tavern is not an expressive association because "'[w]hile the Smoking Bans restrict where a
person may smoke, it is a far cry to allege that such restrictions unduly interfere with
smokers' right to associate freely with whomever they choose in the pursuit of any protected
First Amendment activity."' (quoting NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp.
2d 461, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))); Semaphore Entm't Grp. Sports Corp. v. Gonzalez, 919 F.
Supp. 543, 550 n.4 (D.P.R. 1996) (stating that participation in a martial artist competition is
not an expressive association); Contreras v. City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 1370, 1388 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (stating that "casual conversation[s] between friends and acquaintances" are merely
"'opportunities of association that do not pertain to expressive association, even if they might
be described as 'associational' in common parlance."' (quoting Glatt v. Chicago Park Dist.,
847 F. Supp. 101, 104 (N.D. 111.1994))), affd in part, vacated in part, 119 F.3d 1286, 1296
(7th Cir. 1997) (vacating the district court's order regarding the costs of litigation); Burrows
v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 712 F. Supp. 620, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Members of
youth soccer teams have not associated for expressive purposes, but to improve athletic
skills. They are playing a game, not promoting an ideal. As this type of association is not
related to 'an individual's freedom to speak, to worship,.. or to petition the government for
the redress of grievances . . . ', this is not the type of expressive association protected by the

first amendment."), affd sub nom. Burrows by Burrows v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
891 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1989). But see Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 396 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the First Amendment
protect[ed] the [exotic] entertainers and audience members' right to free expressive
association" because they "work[ed] together as speaker and audience to create an erotic,
sexually-charged atmosphere"); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229
F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 2000) (("It is entirely possible that a fraternity (or sorority, or similar
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association is not absolute but has limitations.73 The government may
suppress expressive association so long as such suppression withstands a
modified form of strict scrutiny.4 "Infringements on that [expressive
associational] right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms."7
Most United States Supreme Court cases on expressive association
involve state public accommodations laws that ban discrimination based on
race, color, religion, disability, national origin, gender, and, in some cases,
sexual orientation. 6 Other significant cases challenge nondiscrimination
policies or other similar rules that suppress the rights of groups to meet on
government property, such as universities, and express their message.
These cases can be classified based on whether the nondiscrimination law
or policy either suppresses or changes the association's message.
a.

Where the relationship between the group's actual ideas or
message and the burden of the nondiscrimination rule is
attenuated at best

Roberts is the prime example of an expressive association that failed to
show any substantial burden on its message that would result if the
government forced it to include nonmembers. Just as Roberts promulgated
the criteria for intimate association, it also explicitly outlined the
parameters of expressive association, especially in the context of quasigroup) could make out a successful expressive association claim.")); IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cnty.,
836 F.2d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that "dating and other social groups" might, in
some instances, constitute an expressive association); Bray v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp.
2d 480, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a group of bicyclists was an expressive association
because their rides were "intended to promote the environmental and aesthetic benefits of
alternative modes of transportation").
73. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
74. See id. (giving standard of review for expressive association); 16A AM. JUR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 587 (2013).

75. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
76. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 645; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp.,
515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995); N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1988); Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1987);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
77. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (2010); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1972).
78. Inazu, supra note 13, at 558.
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commercial organizations." Although the Jaycees were technically a private
club, they had the characteristics of a business training enterprise, which
knocked them into the public accommodations category.80 The Jaycees
"promotes and practices the art of solicitation and management," which
gives its members a distinct advantage when they venture into the realm of
the business environment." The Court acknowledged that "[t]here can be
no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it
does not desire."" Nevertheless, Minnesota had a compelling interest in
eradicating gender discrimination in public accommodations"-an interest
that had merely an incidental and not a material burden on the Jaycees's
expressive association.'
Essentially, the Court failed to see why the admission of women as
members would affect the Jaycees's goal of promoting the success of young
men." The Court did not believe that the forced inclusion of women as
members would alter "the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of
young men, and it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to
exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of
its existing members."" Therefore, Minnesota could legitimately compel the
Jaycees to accept female members because female members would not
substantially impair the Jaycees's expressive message and goals."
79. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616, 625.
80. Id. at 639 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 623 (majority opinion).
83. Id. The Court stated that the public accommodations law "reflects the State's strong
historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to
publicly available goods and services. That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of
expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order." Id. at 624 (citation
omitted).
84. Id. at 626; see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657-58 (2000).
85. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
86. Id.
87. Id. Roberts and Duarteare not the only United States Supreme Court cases that dealt
with the clash between the right to associate and ending gender discrimination. In New York
State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, a coalition of private clubs sought to strike
down New York City's nondiscrimination law. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 7, 9 (1988). The policy banned any club that had more than 400 members
from discriminating on the basis of gender if the club "provides regular meal service and
regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or
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b. Expressive association cases that actually do involve the
suppression of a group's ideas and the changing of the group's
message
(1) Healy v. James
A government entity cannot deny an association access to property that
it has opened up to certain members of the public merely because it
disagrees with the association's philosophy."8 In Healy v. James,89 Central
Connecticut State College's president denied Students for a Democratic
Society ("SDS")90 official recognition as a campus organization.9 1 Although
business." Id. at 6. The Court held the city's nondiscrimination law did not infringe on the
clubs' expressive association because did "not affect 'in any significant way' the ability of
individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints." Id. at 13.
(quoting Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)).
Nevertheless, the Court did acknowledge that it was theoretically possible for a club that
discriminated on the basis of gender to fall under the protection of the First Amendment if
"it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its
desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who
share the same sex, for example, or the same religion." Id. The Court also held that the
nondiscrimination law did not infringe on the clubs' intimate association because clubs had
the characteristics of commercial organizations. Id. at 12.
88. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972).
89. Id.
90. The students who wished to form a local chapter of SDS stated that they had three
goals: to provide "'a forum of discussion and self-education for students developing an
analysis of American society;' [that] would serve as an agency for integrating thought with
action so as to bring about constructive changes; and it would endeavor to provide 'a
coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist students' with other interested groups
on campus and in the community."' Id. at 172. (quoting Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122,
1135-39 app. (1971)). Nevertheless, the Court did note that SDS had a controversial
reputation that arose out of the social turmoil of the 1960s. "There had been widespread civil
disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and
arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others files were looted and
manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic force
during this period." Id. at 171.
91. Id. at 170, 172, 174. The college's denial of SDS's official recognition had severe and
adverse effect on the future viability of SDS's existence:
Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements
regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they
were precluded from using various campus bulletin boards; and-most
importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for
holding meetings. ... Petitioners circulated a notice calling a meeting to discuss
what further action should be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
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the record was not entirely clear regarding the reasons why the president
denied recognition, the Court extrapolated four possible reasons.92 First,
SDS appeared to be affiliated with a national organization that advocated a
philosophy of violence and disruption.9 3 Second, SDS might advocate for
this philosophy of violence on campus." Third, SDS's philosophy would
become a disruptive influence on campus." Fourth, the members of SDS
might refuse to follow the school's code of conduct."
The Court stated that the first three of these reasons were illegitimate
reasons for the school to deny SDS official recognition.97 With the first and
second reasons, the Court emphasized that the president's mere
disagreement with an association's philosophy, however repugnant, did not
justify its exclusion from official recognition." With the third and fourth
reasons, the Court emphasized that "the critical line for First Amendment
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center ('Devils' Den') but were
disbanded on the President's order since nonrecognized groups were not
entitled to use such facilities.
Id. at 176.
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that "'guilt by association alone, without
(establishing) that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government,' is
an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights." Id. at 186 (quoting
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967)).
94. Id. at 187. When it came to whether SDS would advocate a philosophy of violence
on campus, the following series of questions and answers between the college's Student
Affairs Committee and the students who wished to form a local SDS chapter had a
significant impact on the course of litigating this case:
'Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have?
'A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each issue.
'Q. Would you use any means possible?
'A. No I can't say that; would not know until we know what the issues are.
'Q. Could you envision the S.D.S. interrupting a class?
'A. Impossible for me to say.'
Id. at 173.
95. Id. at 188.
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id. at 185.
98. Id. at 187-88. Justice Black once commented: "'I do not believe that it can be too
often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the
First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be
denied to the ideas we cherish."' Id. at 188 (quoting Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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purposes must be drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full
protection, and action, which is not."" The third reason was invalid because
it discriminated more against SDS's advocacy rather than its conduct
because it was not evident that SDS's advocacy would lead to violent
action. 0 The school did not provide enough evidence to prove the fourth
reason, which would be the only legitimate reason for the school to deny
SDS official recognition.' 0
Therefore, the Court held that the effect of the school's denial of
recognition burdened SDS's right to associate because SDS was forbidden
from using all campus facilities to hold meetings, using bulletin boards,
making announcements at rallies, and advertising in the school's
newspaper.102 The school's burden on SDS's right to associate was
unjustifiable, even if the group had the ability to exist outside of the
campus.103

99. Id. at 192. Historically, several Justices on the Court believed that the State can
criminalize behavior, as long as it is aimed at conduct and not exclusively at expressive
advocacy. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 307-08 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that a city ordinance against public nudity was "general
law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, [therefore] it is not subject
to First Amendment scrutiny at all."); see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) ("[If prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is ... merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding the criminalization of polygamy on the
rationale that "[1laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices").
100. Id. at 189-90.
101. Id. at 194.
102. Id. at 176, 181. The Court also stated that the college's refusal to recognized SDS
constituted a prior restraint. Id. at 184. "A prior restraint is an administrative or judicial
order that prohibits speech before it occurs, and it does so on the basis of the speech's
content." See CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 979
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). Prior restraints are not favored by the law and are
presumptively unconstitutional. Id.; Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417, 41920 (1971) (holding that a judicial preliminary injunction against "passing out pamphlets,
leaflets or literature of any kind" was a prior restraint and unconstitutional); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (voiding a permit scheme for religious and
charitable solicitations where a government official had the discretion to deny a permit to
any cause that he considered to be nonreligious); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
713, 722-23 (1931) (holding that a statute that criminalized the newspaper circulation of
defamatory content was a prior restraint and unconstitutional).
103. Id. at 183.
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(2) Hurly v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston
Not only is the government forbidden from suppressing an expressive
association's ideas, it also cannot force an association to accept a member
who will substantially change the association's message. In Hurly v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston," a number of
homosexual descendants of Irish immigrants ("GLIB") sued South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council ("Council") because they were excluded from
marching under their own banner in Boston's St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation
Day Parade.'o For nearly fifty years, the city of Boston had granted the
Council, a private association, the exclusive right to organize the city's St.
Patrick's Day parade.o' GLIB tenaciously claimed that their exclusion from
participating as a distinct and expressive unit in the parade constituted
discrimination and violated Massachusetts's public accommodations law.'o
Nevertheless, the Council did not exclude members of GLIB from
participating as individuals in other groups that had a different theme in the
parade.' The Massachusetts's Supreme Judicial Court held in favor of
GLIB because the Council did not promote a specific message in its
parades.1o'
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and unanimously held that
it violates the First Amendment to force a private parade to admit a group
that expresses a message that is contrary to the private organizer's wishes."o
104. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
105. Id. at 560-61. The designated name of this parade has a highly fascinating history:
March 17 is set aside for two celebrations in South Boston. As early as 1737,
some people in Boston observed the feast of the apostle to Ireland, and since
1776 the day has marked the evacuation of royal troops and Loyalists from the
city, prompted by the guns captured at Ticonderoga and set up on Dorchester
Heights under General Washington's command. Washington himself
reportedly drew on the earlier tradition in choosing "St. Patrick" as the
response to "Boston," the password used in the colonial lines on evacuation
day.

Id. at 560.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 561. The public accommodations law prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in "any place ... which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of
the general public," including boardwalks, and places of public entertainment. Id. at 561-62.
108. Id. at 572.
109. Id. at 563-64.
110. Id.at 566.
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Parades are inherently an expressive form of communication because
citizens march in a parade to espouse a certain point, even if that point is
conveyed purely through symbolism and not spoken words."' Although the
Council did not express a specific message against GLIB, "a private speaker
does not forfeit constitutional protection [to have autonomy over his
message] simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their
themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech."1 2 In fact, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's application
of the public accommodations law essentially transformed the Council's
speech into a public accommodation, which essentially allowed anyone who
desired to join the parade to mold the Council's speech." 3
(3) Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
A corollary case to Hurly is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,"' where the
Boy Scouts of America ("Boy Scouts") expelled an assistant scoutmaster
after he campaigned for values that were contrary to the Boy Scouts's
values' by publicly announcing in a newspaper interview that he was a
homosexual activist and advocating for homosexual role models for
children."' The former assistant scoutmaster claimed that the Boy Scouts's
revocation of his membership violated New Jersey's public
accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation."' The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed and held that
the Boys Scouts were a public accommodation."'

111. Id. at 568-69. "Real 'parades are public dramas of social relations, and in them
performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for
communication and consideration."' Id. at 568 (quoting S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER:
STREET THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)).

112. Id. at 569-70.
113. Id. at 573.
114. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
115. Id. at 644-45. The values of the Boy Scouts are embodied in two statements: the
Scout Oath and Scout Law. Id. at 649. The Scout Oath says: "On my honor I will do my
best[:] To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other
people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight."
BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, BOY ScouT HANDBOOK 9 (11th ed. 1998). The Scout Law says: "A
Scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty,
brave, clean, and reverent." Id.
116. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-45.
117. Id. at 645.
118. Id. at 646. New Jersey's public accommodations law stated:

2014]

ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACYAS A REMEDY

527

The United State Supreme Court disagreed,"' and, in a five-to-four split
opinion, held that the State's interest in ending discrimination did not
outweigh the significant and unconstitutional burden that it imposed on the
Boy Scouts's expressive association.120 If the State forced the Boy Scouts to
readmit the former assistant scoutmaster as a member, the State would also
essentially force the Boy Scouts to send a message that it approves of

homosexual conduct. 12 1
The four dissenting justices, including Justice Souter, who wrote the
Hurly opinion,122 believed that Boy Scouts's expressive values are not
contrary to homosexuals whatsoever. 2 Even if inclusion of a homosexual
did burden the Boy Scouts's values, it was not significant enough to warrant
exclusion because those values lacked clarity. 124 The dissent emphasized the
"All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public
accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real
property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or
sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons.
This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right."
Id. at 661-62 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000)).
119. There are three reasons why the majority disagreed with the New Jersey Supreme
Court:
First, associations do not have to associate for the "purpose" of
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity
that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection....
Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders from
disseminating views on sexual issues-a fact that the Boy Scouts disputes with
contrary evidence-the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts' method of
expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to avoid questions of
sexuality and teach only by example, this fact does not negate the sincerity of its
belief discussed above.
Third, the First Amendment simply does not require that every member of a
group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be "expressive
association."
Id. at 655.
120. Id. at 659.
121. Id. at 650, 656, 661.
122. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559
(1995).
123. Dale, 530 U.S. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 685.
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Roberts opinion to say that the proper analysis for a court is to inquire into
whether the antidiscrimination rule "'impose[d] any serious burdens' on the
group's 'collective effort on behalf of [its] sharedgoals,"' that outweighs the
state's compelling interest in ending discrimination.12 5 In this case, the
dissent believed that the state's interest in ending discrimination was
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, the latter of which is forbidden.'26
Furthermore, an association defending against an antidiscrimination rule
"must at least show it has adopted and advocated an unequivocal position
inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom
the organization seeks to exclude."'27
In contrast to the majority,' 8 the dissent does not defer to the
association's asserted beliefs, but rather requires the association to convince
the Court that it genuinely holds those beliefs.'2 9 Unlike the Court's
unanimous decision in Hurly, which was written four years prior to Dale,
the dissent departs from their previous decision, which did not require the
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council to prove that it took an
unequivocal expressive position against homosexual behavior. 30
(4) California Democratic Party v. Jones
Expressive association, and, particularly, the idea that the government
cannot change the message of an association, extends not only to purely
private groups, but also to political parties.'' In CaliforniaDemocraticParty
v. Jones,'3 2 California voters adopted a proposition that changed the election
125. Id. at 683 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626-27 (1984)). The
majority also held to this interpretation of Roberts, but believed that there was a serious
burden on the Boy Scouts's shared values. See id. at 650, 657 (majority opinion).
126. See id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 687.
128. The majority clearly "give[s] deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression ... [and] give[s] deference to an association's view of what would
impair its expression." Id. at 653 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id.; see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1995). Although the dissent in Dale denied departing from Hurley, it made a weak
argument for distinguishing between the two cases. While conveniently ignoring the
homosexual assistant scoutmaster's newspaper interview and activism, the dissent contended
that unlike Hurley, the homosexual assistant scoutmaster's membership in the Boys Scouts
would have no influence on the public's perception of the Boy Scouts's speech. See Dale, 530
U.S. at 645, 694-95.
131. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
132. Id. at 567.
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primary process for all parties from a closed-partisan-primary to an openblanket-primary.13 Four political parties contended that the proposition
violated their right to freedom of association and sought injunctive and
declaratory relief." The State contended that primaries are a component of
the public interest and are not private proceedings; thus, the State was
merely regulating an election process.' The Court disagreed and held that
"[iln no area is the political association's right to exclude more important
than in the process of selecting its nominee."'36 The right to associate is
meaningless unless associations have the right to exclude those who are

133. Id. at 570. There are several different types of election primaries. A closed primary is
where "only voters who are registered as members of a political party prior to the primary
date may participate in the nomination process for its candidates." State Primary Election
Types, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last visited July, 23, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/primary-types.aspx. An open primary
allows "any registered voter to cast a vote in a primary, regardless of his or her political
affiliation. This means that a Democrat could 'cross over' and cast a vote in the Republican
primary, or vice versa, and an unaffiliated voter can choose either major party's primary." Id.
There are also different combinations between open and closed primaries. Id. The primary at
issue in Jones, was an open-blanket-primary, where "each voter's primary ballot ... lists
every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among
them. ... [But] the candidate of each party who wins the greatest number of votes is the
nominee of that party at the ensuing general election." Jones, 530 U.S. at 570 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571. The political parties that brought suit included the following:
the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of
California, and the Peace and Freedom Party. Id.
135. Id. at 572.
136. Id. at 575. The regulation of primary elections is generally, but not always, subject to
strict scrutiny if it interferes with a voter's or a party's First Amendment rights. See MASSEY,
supra note 102, at 1036; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 210-11, 229
(1986) (voiding a primary election law, as applied, that "requir[ed] voters in any party
primary to be registered members of that party" when it interfered with the associational
rights of a state party wanted to include independent voters in the selection process of its
nominees); Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216-17, 232 (1989)
(voiding a primary election law that prohibited political party officials from "endors[ing],
support[ing], or oppos[ing], any candidate for nomination by that party for partisan office in
the direct primary election"). Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 52, 58-59, 61 (1973)
(using heightened scrutiny to void a primary election law that prevented voters from voting
in a primary election if they had also voted in another party's primary election within the
previous twenty-three months), with Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1973)
(using minimal scrutiny to uphold a primary election law that required voters to register
eight to eleven months before voting in a primary election).
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antithetical to the expressive purpose and philosophy of the association.'
The underlying problem with the California proposition is that it forces
"political parties to associate with-to have their nominees, and hence their
positions, determined by-those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with
the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival."'38 The State
had no compelling interest'39 to change the message and, consequently, the
outcome of party elections.'
(5) Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc.
Government infringements on expressive association cross ideological
boundaries. Regardless of the political party in power, the government can
impermissibly use its power to subsidize with funds to alter or undermine a
group's expression. Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic and InstitutionalRights,
Inc.1' involved an association of law schools and facilities that formed a
coalition to challenge the Solomon Amendment."4 The law schools had
137. Jones, 530 U.S. at 574.
138. Id. at 577.
139. Id. at 584. The State offered a number of purported compelling interests, including:
electing officials who are more representative of the electorate, expanding the debate on the
issues beyond partisan politics, allowing independent voters and voters who are political
minorities to participate in the selection of the primary candidates, promoting fairness,
granting voters a greater choice of candidates, and protecting privacy. Id. at 582-84.
140. Id. at 581-82, 586. The cases after Jones have departed from the application of strict
scrutiny to party elections in several instances. In Clingman v. Beaver, the Court modified
the rule to make it more akin to a balancing test. "Regulations that impose severe burdens on
associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. However,
when regulations impose lesser burdens, 'a State's important regulatory interests will usually
be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.'" Clingman v. Beaver, 544
U.S. 581, 586-87 (2005) (plurality opinion) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)). There, the Court held that Oklahoma's semi-closed
primary, which allowed political parties to invite independents to vote in their elections, did
not compel "association with unwanted members or voters." Id. at 584, 587. In Washington
State Grange v. Washington State Republication Party,the Court applied a balancing test to
uphold a primary election law that mandated candidates to be "identified on the ballot by
their self-designated 'party preference;' that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the
top two votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general
election." Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
444, 458-59 (2008). The Court reasoned that "unlike the California primary [in Jones], the
[Washington] primary does not, by its terms, choose parties' nominees." Id. at 453.
141. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
142. Id. at 51-52. As explained in Rumsfeld,
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restricted military recruiters from accessing their campuses because the
universities opposed the military's policy against openly homosexual
soldiers."' Congress reacted by passing the Solomon Amendment, which
prohibited universities from receiving federal funding if they restricted
military recruiters from their campuses.'" The law schools argued that the
Solomon Amendment violated their right to associate because it undermined
their "ability to express their message that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is wrong ... [by requiring] the presence of military
recruiters on campus and the schools' obligation to assist them."'
The Court held that the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, but not
expressive behavior.' 46 Furthermore, unlike the Dale case, this regulation of
conduct does not encroach on the law schools' right to associate.' In this
context, the Court indicated that there are two types of regulations of an
association. The first type is where the government coerces a group to
formally accept members that it does not want.' The second type is where
the government encourages-or depending on another perspective, actually
coerces-a group to interact with and aid outsiders without technically

The Solomon Amendment denield] federal funding to an institution of higher
education that "has a
policy or practice . .. that either prohibits, or in effect prevents" the military
"from gaining access to campuses, or access to students ... on campuses, for
purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other
employer."
Id. at 55 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2000)). Nevertheless, the Solomon
Amendment also had "an exception for an institution with 'a longstanding policy of pacifism
based on historical religious affiliation."' Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2) (2000)).
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 51, 55.
145. Id. at 68. In a much broader sense, the law schools essentially argued that the
Solomon Amendment forced them "to choose between exercising their First Amendment
right to decide whether to disseminate or accommodate a military recruiter's message, and
ensuring the availability of federal funding for their universities." Id. at 53.
146. Id. at 60. The Court concluded that "[a]s a general matter, the Solomon Amendment
regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do-afford equal access to
military recruiters-not what they may or may not say." Id.
147. Id. at 69. "The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law school's First
Amendment rights. A military recruiter's mere presence on campus does not violate a law
school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the
recruiter's message." Id. at 70.
148. See id. at 69.
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inducting them into the group's membership.'
The first type is
impermissible and a violation of associational rights, but the second type is
permissible and not a violation of associational rights.' Essentially, this
case seemingly grants the government the power to coerce groups to
associate with other persons as long as the government is not coercing
groups to formally accept these persons as members. Unfortunately, this
allows the government to walk a thin line that is shaded rather than bright.
Most of the foregoing cases establish by a narrow split between the
Justices on the Court that the government may not force expressive groups
to associate with persons who may alter their message."s' Nevertheless, the
landmark case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez'52 authorizes the
government, in certain instances, to use coercive methods to compel
expressive groups to not only associate with outsiders, but also to formally
accept them into the group.' Before the Martinez case is examined, it is
necessary to explore the rules pertaining to restrictions of speech on
government property, including public fora.
C. Restrictions of Speech on Government Property
The First Amendment generally provides broad protection for an
American citizen's right to speak freely.' Nevertheless, when American

149. See id.
150. See id. The Court elaborated on this distinction:
To comply with the statute, law schools must allow military recruiters on
campus and assist them in whatever way the school chooses to assist other
employers. Law schools therefore "associate" with military recruiters in the
sense that they interact with them. But recruiters are not part of the law school.
Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited
purpose of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's
expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike the public
accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law
school "'to accept members it does not desire.'"
Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
151. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 566 (1995); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972); but see Rumsfeld, 547 U.S.
at 50, 69 (2006) (all members of the Court joined in the opinion, except for Justice Alito).
152. Christian Legal Soc'yv. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
153. See id. at 3011 (Alito, J., dissenting).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
'"the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
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citizens are on government property, the government may limit their
speech based on the characteristics of the speech and the classification, or
"forum," of the property.155
1. Restrictions on the Characteristics of Speech
The Court has divided government restrictions on free speech into three
categories: content-based discrimination; content-neutral discrimination;
and viewpoint discrimination." 6 Content-based discrimination occurs
when the government limits the subject matter of the speech to certain
topics."' In contrast, a restriction on speech is content-neutral if it is
"justified without reference to the content [subject matter] of the regulated
speech.""' Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government permits
the subject matter of the speech but prohibits the discussion of the subject
matter from a particular perspective."'
Unlike content-based

of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.'" Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,
573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)).
155. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (This is a
seminal case in defining public fora).
156. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 829-30, 894
(1995) (holding that a state university that refused to pay for the publication costs of a student
organization's newspaper on the sole basis that it "'primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belief.. . in or about a deity or an ultimate reality' constituted viewpoint discrimination) (quoting
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4, Rosenberger,515 U.S. 819 (No. 94-329)).
157. See id. at 828-29.
158. DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that a
noise ordinance that a city enforced against a night club was content-neutral and a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction).
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 (1989) (citation omitted) (holding that
a city's regulation of sound amplification in a public park was content-neutral and a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction).
159. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829. ("The government must abstain from regulating speech
when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
rationale for the restriction.").
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discrimination, viewpoint discrimination is hardly ever permissible."'o
Within each forum, the government may place restrictions that
discriminate based on the content of the speech under certain conditions."'
These conditions vary according to the classification of the forum.'62
2.

Restrictions of Speech in Public Fora

There are four types of public fora: a traditional public forum, a
designated public forum, a limited public forum, and a nonpublic forum.'
160. Id.; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394, 397 (1993)
(holding that a public school's denial of a church from showing a film on its premises after schools
hours constituted viewpoint discrimination, even though it was a limited public forum).
161. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
162. Id. Even if a restriction on speech is otherwise proper based on the classification of
the forum, a person can still challenge the restriction under the Overbreadth and Vagueness
doctrines. The Overbreadth doctrine is "based on an appreciation that the very existence of
some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others not
before the court." Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992); see City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984). An individual
may "challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the courtthose who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing
so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid."' Bd.
of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (quoting Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)). The standard of review is whether the
challenged rule reaches a substantial amount of expressive activity, so that it not only
prohibits unprotected speech, but also deeply encroaches into protected speech. United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). Even a "clear and precise enactment" is
overbroad when it sweeps speech within its restriction that is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972). The
Vagueness doctrine states that a restriction fails the requirements of Due Process when it is
so vague and standardless that (1) "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973), and (2) it fails to provide fair
warning so that "it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits...." City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,
402-03 (1966)). The restriction's "chilling effect" on speech "must be both real and
substantial, and a narrowing construction must be unavailable before a court will set it
aside." Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing Young v.
Am. Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976)); see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98
(1945). The Vagueness doctrine ensures that any restriction on speech must articulate
explicit standards to guide the authorities who are to apply it so that they do not engage in
viewpoint discrimination. Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d
1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)).
163. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992).
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Although the Court has historically used the public fora approach to
analyze restrictions on speech, the Court has recently used a public fora
analysis to limit expressive association on government property.16
a.

Traditional public fora

A traditional public forum is government property that has
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions," 6 including streets and
public parks.166 A person's expressive behavior in traditional public forum is
entitled to the highest protection because the "use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens."' 7 Therefore, government regulation of the
content of speech in a traditional public forum is subject to strict scrutiny.6
This means that a court will presume that the restriction is invalid, 6 1 which
places the burden on the government to "show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end" using the least restrictive means. 70
b.

Designated public fora

A designated public forum is where the government has opened its
property for "indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes.""
This pertains to property that the government has not held "immemorially"
in the public trust, but, rather, it is property that the government is not

164. See Christian Legal Soc'yv. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (2010).
165. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
166. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). But see
Summum, 555 U.S. at 464 (holding that the placement of a permanent monument in a public
park is not subject to the fora analysis because it is a form of government speech).
167. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
168. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990). Nevertheless, the government
may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions for the expressive behavior as
long as the restrictions are content-neutral. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).
169. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
170. PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980));
see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976).
171. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392 (1993).
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required to but chooses to open to the public." 2 When "[t]he government
creates a designated public forum .. . [it] treat[s] [the property] as if it were

a traditional public forum."" Although the government is not required to
keep a designated forum open to the public indefinitely, any government
restriction on speech in a designated public forum is also subject to strict
scrutiny. 74
c.

Limited public fora

A limited public forum is also property that the government has opened
for public discourse, but "the State is not required to and does not allow
persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified 'in
reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics."" 7 Unlike traditional and designated public fora, a limited public
forum is not subject to strict scrutiny.'7 6 Instead, "a government entity may
impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral" in
7
light of the purpose for which the forum was created.
d. Nonpublic fora
"[A] nonpublic forum is a publicly-owned property that is not by
tradition or governmental designation 'a forum for public

172. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992); Perry
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
173. Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 534 (6th Cir. 2010).
174. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678; PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
175. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)) (holding that a public school's exclusion of
a religious club from meeting after school hours constituted viewpoint discrimination).
176. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009); see Christian Legal Soc'y
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010).
177. Summum, 555 U.S. at 470; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68, 277 (1981)
(holding that a state university that opened its facilities to student secular groups but not to
student religious groups constituted content-based discrimination, which also implied
viewpoint discrimination, even though it was a limited public forum). It is also important to
note that the Court has never quite clearly articulated what level of scrutiny, such as
intermediate or minimal, is used to analyze a limited public forum. See Good News Club, 533
U.S. at 106. Nevertheless, there is one point that the Court has made clear, which is that a
limited public forum is subject to a lesser level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny. Id.; cf Miller v.
City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[S]peech in both a limited public
forum and a nonpublic forum receive the same level of scrutiny.").
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communication."" 7 ' Essentially, a nonpublic forum is any other
government property that does not fit in the aforementioned fora, including
airports, post offices, military bases, and advertising space on public
transportation."' Like a limited public forum, the government may limit
speech in a nonpublic forum to a certain topic and exclude speakers who
deviate from that topic-as long as the restriction is reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.'s Nevertheless, the government, at its discretion, may
transform a nonpublic forum into either a designated or limited public
forum.'s It is the government's intent that determines whether government
property is a designated, limited, or nonpublic forum.'82
Although these rules pertaining to speech in public fora have never
historically applied to the right to associate, Martinez applied the public
fora doctrine to an expressive association.'83 It specifically authorizes the
government to interfere with expressive associations that gather in limited
public fora.8 4 Martinez places the right to associate in great jeopardy
178. Miller, 622 F.3d at 535 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Helms v. Zubaty, 495 F.3d 252, 256
(6th Cir. 2007)).

179. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (holding
that airport terminals are nonpublic fora); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990)
(holding that the sidewalk of a post office is a nonpublic forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983) (holding that a public school mail system is a
nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that "the business of a
military installation ... [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum"); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding that advertising space on public
transportation is not a public forum).
180. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 808 (1985)
(holding that the government may exclude charity drives aimed at federal employees in the
federal workplace, in part, because the federal workplace is a nonpublic forum).
The Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only
be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation. In contrast to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility
between the nature of the speech or the identity of the speaker and the
functioning of the nonpublic forum is not mandated.
Id. at 808.
181. Id. at 802; Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 534 (6th'Cir. 2010).
182. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 ("The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse."); Miller, 622 F.3d at 534 ("Governmental intent
is the 'touchstone' of a court's analysis in determining whether it has created a public
forum." (quoting Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348-49 (6th Cir. 2001))).
183. Christian Legal Soc'yv. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,2986 (2010).
184. Id. at 2985-86.
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because it opens the door for government to compel one to associate with
others.
D. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez... drastically reduced the rights of
groups that engage in expressive behavior. In Martinez, the Hastings
College of Law, a California public school, used its nondiscrimination
policy to bar the Christian Legal Society ("CLS"), a religious organization,
from official recognitionl86 as a school club."' The law school contended
that CLS's bylaws violated the school's nondiscrimination policy. because
the bylaws required students who wanted to become members and officers
in CLS to sign a statement of faith' and to live their lives based on certain

185. Id. at 2971.
186. The benefits of official recognition included the following:
Groups that are granted registration are entitled to meet on university grounds
and to access multiple channels for communicating with students and facultyincluding posting messages on designated bulletin boards, sending mass emails to the student body, distributing material through the Student
Information Center, and participating in the annual student organizations fair.
They may also apply for limited travel funds, which appear to total about
$4,000 to $5,000 per year.... Most of the funds available to RSOs [Registered
Student Organizations] come from an annual student activity fee that every
student must pay.
Id. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 3001.
188. The nondiscrimination policy states:
"[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally impermissible, arbitrary
or unreasonable discriminatory practices. All groups, including administration,
faculty, student governments, [Hastings] -owned student residence facilities and
programs sponsored by [Hastings], are governed by this policy of
nondiscrimination. [Hasting's] policy on nondiscrimination is to comply fully
with applicable law. ["]
"[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This
nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastingssponsored programs and activities."
Id. at 2979 (majority opinion) (quoting Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
app. 220 (2010)).
189. "The Statement of Faith provides:"
"Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
0
One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
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principles.o Specifically, the law school contended that CLS discriminated
on the basis of religion and sexual orientation.19 ' CLS countered that the law
school's nondiscrimination policy violated their free speech and expressive
associational rights. 9 2 The law school subsequently invented an "allcomers" policy during the course of the litigation.'" This all-comers policy
purportedly interpreted the nondiscrimination policy to require all student
clubs to "allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek
leadership positions in the organization, regardless of... status or
beliefs."' 94 The Court resolved the case based on the all-comers policy, but
not the nondiscrimination policy as written, which left open the question of
whether a public university or other government entity can use its
nondiscrimination policy to passively force coercive association. "
In laying a foundation to decide this case, the majority opinion
promulgated a new method for analyzing expressive association where the
alleged constitutional violation occurs on government property.'9 6 The
Court reasoned that free speech and expressive association are functionally
equivalent if they "arise in exactly the same context.""' Given that CLS
brought both of these claims against a state institution, they must be

God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's only Son conceived of the Holy
Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through
which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return.
o
The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.
o
The Bible as the inspired Word of God."
Id. at 2980 n.3 (quoting Christian Legal Soc'yv. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 app. 226 (2010)).
190. Id. at 2980. These principles included that belief that "sexual activity should not
occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman; CLS thus interprets its bylaws to
exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in 'unrepentant homosexual conduct."' Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2981.
193. "Overwhelming evidence, however, shows that Hastings denied CLS's application
pursuant to the Nondiscrimination Policy and that the accept-all-comers policy was
nowhere to be found until it was mentioned by a former dean in a deposition taken well after
this case began." Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. at 2979 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 2984.
196. Id. at 2985-86.
197. Id. at 2985.
o
o
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resolved under a limited-public-forum analysis.'" The Court stated that a
limited-public-forum analysis was necessary to balance CLS's free speech
and expressive association rights with the law school's rights as a "property
owner and educational institution." 99
In analyzing CLS's claims, the Court held that, the law school's allcomers policy was both reasonable2 00 and viewpoint neutral2 0' under a
198. Id. at 2986. The majority opinion gave three reasons for applying a limited-publicforum analysis:
First, the same considerations that have led us to apply a less restrictive level
of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums as compared to other
environments apply with equal force to expressive association occurring in
limited public forums ....
Second, and closely related, the strict scrutiny we have applied in some
settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect,
invalidate a defining characteristic of limited public forums-the State may
"reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.. .
Third, this case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category,
for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect
pressure to modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for
any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recognition. The expressiveassociation precedents on which CLS relies, in contrast, involved regulations
that compelled a group to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt
out.
Id. at 2985-86 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 2986.
200. The majority opinion stated that the all-comers policy was reasonable for four
reasons:
First, the open-access policy "ensures that the leadership, educational, and
social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students. . . ."
Second, the all-comers requirement helps Hastings police the written terms
of its Nondiscrimination Policy without inquiring into an RSO's motivation for
membership restrictions ....

Third, the Law School reasonably adheres to the view that an all-comers
policy, to the extent it brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds
and beliefs, "encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students
Fourth, Hastings' policy, which incorporates-in fact, subsumes-state-law
proscriptions on discrimination, conveys the Law School's decision "to decline
to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the people of
California disapprove."
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limited-public-forum analysis.202 Although CLS's continued existence
would be problematic because the law school denied it the benefits of
official recognition, the majority stated that CLS was mildly burdened by
the all-comers policy, because there were significant "other available
avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights [that]
lessen[ed] the burden created by those barriers."203 Furthermore, the Court
claimed that the law school's all-comers policy merely discriminated against
CLS's act of excluding members and not their beliefs."
Although the fateful Martinez decision allows coerced association under
an all-comers policy, it left the issue unresolved as it pertains to
nondiscrimination policies.205 Prior to Martinez, the United States Courts of
Appeals and several United States District Courts had several opportunities
to address the right to associate as it relates to nondiscrimination polices.
These courts are split on whether the government can use
nondiscrimination policies or other similar rules to compel groups to
associate with outsiders. Several of their prominent decisions and rationales
will now be discussed.206
Id. 2989-90 (quoting Brief of Hastings College of the Law Respondents at 32, Martinez, 130
S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)).
201. The majority held that the all-comers policy was purportedly "'justified without
reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated speech."' Id. at 2994 (quoting Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
202. Id. at 2995.
203. Id. at 2991.The dissent was perplexed by the majority's reasoning here, because "one
of CLS's principal claims is that it was subjected to discrimination based on its viewpoint, the
majority's emphasis on CLS's ability to endure that discrimination-by using private
facilities and means of communication-is quite amazing." Id. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the majority conveniently ignored the rule that a "student group's 'possible
ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the
disabilities imposed by' nonrecognition." Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 864
(7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972)).
204. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994.
205. Id. at 2984.
206. The cases discussed in this next section are about where a government uses its
nondiscrimination policy to deny expressive associations access from public fora. There is
one other fascinating case where the government denied an expressive association access to
public fora, but did not involve a nondiscrimination policy. In the Sixth Circuit case of Miller
v. City of Cincinnati,an Ohio nonpartisan political action committee opposed a plan by the
City of Cincinnatito implement "an automated photo-monitoring program to enforce traffic
regulations." Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2010). When the
political action committee wished to hold a rally and press conference in the interior lobby of
city hall, the city denied the committee access pursuant a policy that required advocacy

542

E.

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:507

The CircuitSplit
1. Second Circuit

The Second Circuit holds that where the inclusion of outsiders would
undermine a group's message, expressive association protects the group's
decision to exclude outsiders only to the extent that its purpose is to "foster
the group's shared interest in particular speech."207 In Hsu ex rel. Hsu v.
Roslyn Union Free School DistrictNo. 3,208 two high school students wanted
to form an after school Bible club.2 09 The students wrote the club's
constitution and submitted it to the school's principal, board, and district
superintendent for approval.2"0 Later, the principal and district
superintendent met with the students and told them that the constitutional
provision that limited the club's "officers to 'professed Christians' and those
who have 'accepted Jesus Christ as savior' .. . violated the District's
'nondiscrimination policy." 2 1 ' Furthermore, the school board refused to
recognize the club unless its founders removed the provision that limited

groups to get a city council member to sponsor their planned events inside city call. Id. at
529-30. The court held that city hall was at best, a limited public forum, and that the policy
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 535-36. Furthermore, the court held that the
policy did not infringe on the political action committee's expressive association because it
did not affect their decision of whom to select as members. Id. at 538. "Officials who
,sponsor' or 'collaborate' with groups to use the interior spaces do not become members of
the group-they are outsiders with whom groups must interact only for the limited purpose
of accessing the city hall space." Id.
207. Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 859 (2d Cir.
1996).
208. Id. at 839.
209. Id. at 848-49.
210. Id. at 849.
211. Id. at 850. The school's policy prohibited discrimination:
"[O1n the basis of race, color, national origin, creed or religion, marital
status, sex, age or handicapping condition," in providing "access to ... student
activities."
[The policy] requires that the District provide every student with equal
educational opportunities regardless of race, color, creed, sex, national origin,
religion, age, marital status, or disability. No student will be excluded on such
basis from participating in or having access to any course offerings, athletics,
counseling, employment assistance, extracurricularactivities or other school
resources.
Id.
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the club's officers to professing Christians. 212 The students brought legal
action and moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court
denied.213
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in
part, 214 and held that "the School's complete ban on 'religious
discrimination,' however it is enforced, also bans the Bible club envisioned
by the Hsus."215 Yet, the Hsus were likely to succeed on some, but not all of
their claims. 216 Although the school was a limited public forum, secondary
public schools may not ban religious clubs from meeting under the Equal
Access Act 217 by conditioning official recognition on the abandonment of
their core principles. 218 The Equal Access Act did not explicitly mention
expressive association, but it encompassed "an implicit right of expressive
association when the goal of that association is to meet for a purpose
protected by the Act."' Nevertheless, the court held that the club could
only require its president, vice president, and music coordinator to be
professing Christians "because their duties consist of leading Christian
prayers and devotions and safeguarding the 'spiritual content' of the
meetings." 2 20 In contrast, the other officer positions were not essential to
promoting the core religious principles of the club and thus not protected

212. Id. at 850-51.
213. Id. at 851-52.
214. Id. at 873.
We hold only that, on this record, the Hsus are likely to succeed on that part of
their Equal Access Act claim that relates to the Club's President, VicePresident, and Music Coordinator. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for the issuance of an injunction and additional proceedings (if
necessary) that are consistent with this opinion.
Id.
215. Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 872-73.
217. The Equal Access Act states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or
a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct
a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
Id. at 854 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)).
218. Id. at 862.
219. Id. at 859.
220. Id. at 858.
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by expressive association.221 Furthermore, the club is less likely to be
protected by expressive association if it "engages in social and community
activities that are not integral to a sectarian religious experience. "222
The Second Circuit has also extended the reasoning in the Roberts
decision to nondiscrimination policies. In Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon
PI Fraternityv. City University of New York,22 3 the College of Staten Island224
denied official recognition to an all-male Jewish fraternity club because the
fraternity violated the college's nondiscrimination policy by discriminating
on the basis of gender. 225 Although the fraternity argued that its message
was that it was a "predominantly Jewish male fraternity," 226 like Roberts, the
trial court questioned "why women would significantly affect the
Fraternity's ability to engage in such expression." 227 Furthermore, the court

221. See id. at 857-58. According to the court, the club's other officers, including the
activities coordinator, were purportedly not essential to its expression. Id. Regarding the
activities coordinator, the court stated that "an agnostic with an understanding of 'Christian
sensibilities' might plan these activities as well as any other student." Id. at 857. The court
also did not believe that the club's "'religious speech'... would be affected by having a nonChristian 'Secretary,' whose principal duties are 'to accurately record the minutes of
meetings and be involved in the Club's financial accounting and reporting.'" Id.
222. See id. The court postulated that skits, guest speakers, games picnics, and
community service projects are not activities are "unambiguously 'religious."' Id.
223. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d
374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated by Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ.
of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating the district court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction, which it issued on the belief that the fraternity was likely to succeed on its claims
regarding intimate association).
224. The College of Staten Island is a subsidiary of City University of New York. Chi Iota
Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity,443 F. Supp. at 376.
225. Id. at 396. The college's nondiscrimination policy stated:
In order for an organization to be officially recognized at the College of Staten
Island, membership and participation in it must be available to all eligible
students of the College. In addition, in order to be recognized, each
organization must agree not to discriminate on the basis of age, alienage or
citizenship, color, gender, differing ability, national or ethnic origin, race,
religion, sexual orientation, veteran or marital status, or social class.
Id. at 380.
226. Id. at 378. The district court characterized this as "a description that suggests that
this [fraternity's] expressive message is composed of the two inseparable components of (1)
appreciating Jewish culture (2) as a male." Id. at 395.
227. Id. at 393. The fraternity especially argued that their value of "brotherhood" was one
of their strongest messages and that admitting women would undermine that message.
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declared that although the "Fraternity does not discriminate on the basis of
faith and welcomes all men who are comfortable with belonging to a group
affiliated with Jewish culture, it is difficult to believe how a woman, whether
Jewish or not, would not be able to hold the same appreciation for Jewish
culture."2 28 Therefore, the fraternity was unlikely to succeed on the merits of
that claim.229
The Second Circuit also allows governments to use their
nondiscrimination policies to exclude groups from participating in
government sponsored charity campaigns, on the basis that a group's
membership composition is incompatible with the government's
nondiscrimination policy. 23 0 In Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, 2 3' a
Connecticut state entity23 2 banned the Boys Scouts from participating in a
state charity campaign that was directed at public employees. 233 For more
than thirty years, the state had allowed the Boy Scouts to participate in the
charity campaign. 234 Nevertheless, the state banned the Boys Scouts from
the charity campaign because the Boys Scouts discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation. 235 The Second Circuit held that the charity drive was a
Nevertheless, the district court held that this was "not enough" to show that the admitting
women would harm the fraternity. Id. at 395.
228. Id. at 393.
229. Id. at 395. The district court denied the fraternity's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the college for their expressive association claim. Id. 395, 397. The
fraternity had also argued that it was an intimate association and it succeeded in persuading
the district court to grant a preliminary injunction for that claim. Id. at 389, 397. On appeal,
the Second Circuit held that the fraternity was not likely to succeed on the merits of its
intimate association claim because there was no limit to its membership, it had "broad,
public-minded goals that do not depend for their promotion on close-knit bonds[,]" it
invited nonmembers to participate in its activities, and it sought to become affiliated with a
national organization. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y.,
502 F.3d 136, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007).
230. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2003).
231. 335 F.3d at 80.
232. The state entity was known as the "Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities." Id. at 85.
233. Id. at 86. The purpose of the charity campaign was to "'raise funds from state
employees for charitable and public health, welfare, environmental, conservation and service
purposes.' Id. at 84. (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 5-262 (2013)).
234. Id. at 85.
235. Id. The state agency argued that "by allowing the [Boy Scouts,] BSA[,J to participate
in the Campaign and to benefit from a fundraiser that used state resources, the [State
Employee Campaign] Committee potentially made the state a party to discrimination in
violation of Connecticut's Gay Rights Law[.]" Id.

546

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:507

nonpublic forum; therefore, the state could exclude the Boy Scouts, if its
nondiscrimination policy was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.2 3 6
Although the court acknowledged that the nondiscrimination policy had
an adverse impact on the Boy Scouts, the court stated that the purpose of
the nondiscrimination policy was "to discourage harmful conduct and not
to suppress expressive association."23 7 Essentially, the nondiscrimination
policy, as written, had the secondary effect 238 of suppressing the Boy Scouts's
viewpoint, but it was not aimed at their viewpoint. 23 9 instead, the state
enacted their nondiscrimination policy to prevent the "immediate harmslike the denial of concrete economic and social benefits-such discrimination
causes homosexuals." 24 0 Furthermore, the nondiscrimination policy was
reasonable because the state had a legitimate interest in ending
discrimination.24 1 Therefore, the court held that that "the removal of the
Boy Scouts from this nonpublic forum did not violate the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right to expressive association."24 2
2. Third Circuit
Although the Third Circuit, at the appellate level, has not resolved any
expressive association cases involving nondiscrimination policies, there is a

236. Id. at 91. In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit relied on Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def & Educ. Fund, Inc., which had held that a "federal charitable campaign was a
nonpublic forum and concluded that access to the campaign 'can be restricted as long as the
restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."' Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
237. Id. at 93, 95.
238. The Secondary Effects doctrine says that the "governments may regulate speech (even
by apparent reference to its content) if its purpose for doing so is wholly unrelated to the
content of the speech but is instead designed to ameliorate some phenomenon closely associate
with speech but not produced by the content of the speech." See MASSEY, supra note 102, at 927.
Although the court in Wyman did not specifically mention the Secondary Effects doctrine, its
rationale relied on the Supreme Court's discussion of the Secondary Effects doctrine in R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul. Compare Wyman, 335 F.3d at 93-94, with RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 389-90 (1992). Nevertheless, the Secondary Effects doctrine applies to restrictions that
have the effect of governing the content of expression; but instead, the Second Circuit's analysis
in Wyman focused on viewpoint discrimination, which is almost never allowed. See Wyman,
335 F. 3d at 93-94; Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
239. Wyman, 335 F.3d at 93-94.
240. Id. at 93.
241. Id. at 98.
242. Id. at 84.
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significant district court decision within that circuit. In Cradle of Liberty
24 3
Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
the City of Philadelphia attempted to
coerce the Boy Scouts into changing its membership policy because it
violated the city's nondiscrimination policy. 2" For more than eighty years,
the Boy Scouts had used a building as its regional headquarters, which was
owned by the city.2 45 The city did not charge the Boy Scouts rent for using
the building.24 6 Eventually, the city became offended at the Boy Scouts for
denying membership to homosexuals.2 47 The city gave the Boy Scouts an
ultimatum: the Boys Scouts must change their membership policy, pay the
city $200,000 per year to use the building, or be evicted. 2 At the trial court,
the city argued that it should prevail based on the Court's decision in
Martinez. 24 9
Although -the building was a nonpublic forum,25 0 the trial court
2 51
distinguished this case from Martinez.
In Martinez the plaintiff made one
claim two different ways, which was essentially "that the government's
policy violated its right to express its views."252 In this case, the Boy Scouts
alleged two separate claims-the city's ultimatum violated the doctrine of

243. Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 851 F. Supp. 2d 936 (E.D. Pa.
2012).
244. Id. at 948. This case does not recite the city's nondiscrimination policy verbatim.
Nevertheless, the court clearly did state that "a dispute arose between the two parties
concerning Plaintiffs (Boy Scouts's] membership policy [because] Plaintiff denies
membership to openly homosexual men, and Defendant [City] informed Plaintiff that this
practice violates its nondiscrimination laws." Id. at 939.
245. Id. at 938.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. More specifically:
[T]he Philadelphia City Council passed a resolution approving the eviction of
Plaintiff from Defendant's property. Plaintiff [Boy Scouts] was left with three
options: (1) it could continue its rent-free use of the building if it changed its
policy with respect to homosexuals; (2) it could remain in the building and
continue to discriminate if it paid rent in the amount of $200,000 per year; or
(3) it could vacate the building.
Id. at 939 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 941.
250. Id. at 942 n.4.
251. Id. at 942-43 & n.4.
252. Id.
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viewpoint
to
amounted
and
conditions25
unconstitutional
2 54
on the
placed
conditions
the
in
Martinez,
Furthermore,
discrimination.
law
to
the
related
benefits of official recognition dealt with activities that
school. 255 In this case, the ultimatum that the city placed on the Boy Scouts
was much broader and unrelated to their use of the building.256 Therefore, a
reasonable jury could decide that the Boy Scouts should prevail on their
claim regarding unconstitutional conditions, but also could decide that the
Boy Scouts should fail on their viewpoint discrimination claim.257
3.

Seventh Circuit

Prior to the Supreme Court's fateful decision in Martinez, the Seventh
Circuit decided a case that had facts nearly identical to Martinez. In
ChristianLegal Society v. Walker,2 ss the Southern Illinois University School

253. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "prohibits the government from
conditioning the discretionary grant of a benefit on an individual's waiver of a constitutional
right." Pareja v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 615 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2010); See
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) ("[T]he
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit." (quoting
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). "[W]hen a condition for receipt of a government benefit compromises a First
Amendment right, it must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral." Cradle of Liberty Council,
Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
254. Cradle of Liberty Council,Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
255. Id. at 943.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 957-58. At least one scholar has proposed doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as a remedy for similar situations that arise to Martinez and cases that address
nondiscrimination policies in public fora. See Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the
Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 105, 108-10 (2010).
Nevertheless, the doctrine is subject to a test that is similar to the one for a limited public
forum. The government action in a limited public forum and the government condition for
the waiver of a constitutional right must be both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Compare
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010), with Cradle of Liberty
Council, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 948. Given that Martinez decided that Hastings's all-comers
policy was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, an analysis under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions will probably yield the same result. See Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a case involving the "denial of access to a
nonpublic forum or ... the denial of a government benefit" made no difference in how the
court analyzed it, because both were subject to a similar standard of review).
258. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
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of Law revoked its official recognition 259 of CLS because CLS refused to
admit homosexual members, which violated the law school's
nondiscrimination policy. 260 Although CLS's meetings were open to all
students, only Christian members and officers could vote and participate in
CLS's decision-making process.2 61 Unlike Martinez, where the Court
declined to decide the merits of the case regarding Hastings's
nondiscrimination policy, Walker was decided in light of the law school's
nondiscrimination policy. 262
The court recognized that if the "government forces a group to accept for
membership someone the group does not welcome and the presence of the
unwelcome person 'affects in a significant way the group's ability to
advocate' its viewpoint, the government has infringed on the group's
freedom of expressive association."263 Furthermore, the court stated that the
law school had significantly burdened CLS's right of expressive association
to the point where its defining identity might "cease to exist."2 6 4 "It would
be difficult for CLS to sincerely and effectively convey a message of
259. Much like in Martinez, the revocation of CLS's membership caused it to lose the
following benefits:
[A]ccess to the law school List-Serve (the law school's database of e-mail
addresses), permission to post information on law school bulletin boards, an
appearance on lists of official student organizations in law school publications
and on its website, the ability to reserve conference rooms and meeting and
storage space, a faculty advisor, and law school money.
Id. at 857.
260. The law school's nondiscrimination policy was actually embodied in two policies:
The first is SIU's Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity
Policy.... [which] states that SIU will "provide equal employment and
education opportunities for all qualified persons without regard to race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled veteran of the
Vietnam era, sexual orientation, or marital status." The second is a policy of the
SIU Board of Trustees which provides that "[n]o student constituency body or
recognized student organization shall be authorized unless it adheres to all
appropriate federal or state laws concerning nondiscrimination and equal
opportunity."
Id. at 858.
261. Id. at 862-63.
262. Id. at 857.
263. Id. at 861 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)).
264. Id. at 863. The Court emphasized that "CLS's beliefs about sexual morality are
among its defining values; forcing it to accept as members those who engage in or approve of
homosexual conduct would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist."
Id.
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disapproval of certain types of conduct if, at the same time, it must accept
members who engage in that conduct."2 65
The court did not decide whether the law school constituted a particular
forum.266 Nevertheless, the court assumed that even if the law school was a
nonpublic forum, CLS was likely to succeed on its claims for a preliminary
injunction because it is probable that the law school's action constituted
viewpoint discrimination.267 "CLS is the only student group that has been
stripped of its recognized status on the basis that it discriminates on a
ground prohibited by SIU's Affirmative Action/EEO [nondiscrimination]
policy,"2 68 even though other student groups discriminated on the basis of
religion and even gender.269
In Association of Faith-BasedOrganizations v. Bablitch,27 0 a case decided
after Walker, a district court within the Seventh Circuit held that a
Wisconsin state entity cannot use its nondiscrimination policy to exclude
groups from participating in state sponsored charity campaigns.27 ' In that

265. Id.
266. Id. at 866.
267. Id. at 867. Additionally, the court held that CLS was likely to succeed on it claims
because the facts of case were "legally indistinguishable from Healy .. .. CLS was deprived of
the same benefits as the student group in Healy. Both were frozen out of channels of
communication offered by their universities; both were denied university money and access
to private university facilities for meetings." Id. at 864.
268. Id. at 866. The court especially noted:
What interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept members whose activities
violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing particular beliefs
contained in that creed? SIU has identified none. The only apparent point of
applying the policy to an organization like CLS is to induce CLS to modify the
content of its expression or suffer the penalty of derecognition.
Id. at 863.
269. Id. The court elaborated on several specific examples:
The Muslim Students' Association, for example, limits membership to
Muslims. Similarly, membership in the Adventist Campus Ministries is limited
to those "professing the Seventh Day Adventist Faith, and all other students
who are interested in studying the Holy Bible and applying its principles."
Membership in the Young Women's Coalition is for women only, though
regardless of their race, color, creed, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or
physical ability.
Id.
270. Ass'n of Faith-Based Orgs. v. Bablitch, 454 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
271. Id. at 816-17.

2014]1

ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACY AS A REMEDY

551

case, a Wisconsin administrative committee 72 banned a number of religious
organizations participating in a state charity campaign that was directed at
public employees. 27 3 The defendants banned religious organizations from
the charity campaign because the religious organizations violated an
administrative nondiscrimination policy by discriminating on the basis of
religion within their membership structures.2 75 The religious organizations
claimed that the nondiscrimination policy infringed on their expressive
association because it was analogous to "forcing inclusion of board
members who do not hold similar beliefs to those of the organization [s]."276
The court disagreed and held that this was not a case of forced inclusion
because the nondiscrimination policy did not intrude on religious
organizations' right to control their membership and express their views.277
Unlike the student organizations in the Healy and Walker cases, the
continued existence of these religious organizations did not depend on their
participation in the charity drive. 27 8 Therefore, there was no indirect
coercion for the religious organizations to include members that they did
not desire.279

272. Any organization that wished to participate in the charity campaign had to receive
approval from the "Eligibility Committee," a subsidiary of the Wisconsin Department of
Administration. Id. at 813.
273. Id.
274. The nondiscrimination policy regarding the charity campaign, was embodied in an
administrative regulation, which stated:
The charitable organization shall have a policy and procedure of
nondiscrimination in regard to race, color, religion, national origin, handicap,
age, or sex applicable to persons served by the charitable organization,
applicable charitable organization staff employment, and applicable to
membership on the charitable organizations governing board.
Id.
275. Id. at 813-14.
276. Id. at 815.
277. Id. at 815-16. The court also commented that "neither Healy nor Christian Legal
Society stand for the proposition that any withholding of benefits, no matter how slight
relative to the functioning of the organization, amounts to the state compelling an
organization to admit unwanted members." Id. at 816.
278. Id.
279. Id. "Nothing suggests that the absence of that benefit in anyway threatens the
members from pursuing their organizational objectives. Nothing suggests that any member
would be compelled to abandon its rights to expressive association in exchange for this
limited benefit." Id.
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Furthermore, the court, relying on the Second Circuit case of Wyman,
declared that the charity campaign was a nonpublic forum. 28 0 Nevertheless,
unlike Wyman, the court reached a different result. 28 1 In contrast to
Wyman, where Connecticut law prohibited state sponsored charity
campaigns from aiding groups that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, Wisconsin law allows religious organizations to discriminate
on the basis of religion in selecting their members.2 82 Therefore, the Court
held that the nondiscrimination policy, as applied, was unreasonable under
the standard for a nonpublic forum because it stood as a "single stark
exception to a consistent state policy."283
4. Ninth Circuit
Both before and after the Martinez decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a
state-run school may use its nondiscrimination policy to force a student
group to accept nonmembers.2 84 Nevertheless, the Martinez decision
strengthened the Ninth Circuit's position. In Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter
v. Reed,285 San Diego State University denied official recognition to both a
Christian fraternity and a Christian sorority for violating the school's
nondiscrimination policy because they required "that their members and
officers profess a specific religious belief, namely, Christianity." 2 86 The

280. Id.
281. Compare Bablitch, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17, with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman,
335 F.3d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2003).
282. Bablitch, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 817. "Wisconsin does not espouse a policy against
discrimination by religious groups in choosing members of their faith as directors and
employees, and has affirmatively supported such rights. Such discrimination is, of course,
fundamental to the nature of religious organizations and their right of expressive
association." Id.
283. Id. at 817-18. The court declined to decide whether the nondiscrimination policy, as
written or as applied, was viewpoint neutral. Id. at 818.
284. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012); Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that a public high school may use its nondiscrimination policy to deny a student Bible club
official recognition), overruledon other grounds by Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S.
Ct. 447 (2010) (the overruling pertained to a § 1983 procedural matter and did not address
the merits of the foregoing case); see Christian Legal Soc'y. v. Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026,
1032-33 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that a state institution, such as a university, may use its
nondiscrimination and open membership policies to deny a student religious club official
recognition).
285. Reed, 648 F.3d 790.
286. Id. at 796.
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Ninth Circuit extended the reasoning from Martinez to resolve an issue that
the Court left open: nondiscrimination policies.287 Given that the fraternity
and sorority brought both an expressive association and free speech claim,
the court held that in light of Martinez, both of these claims merge because
the school was a limited public forum.2 88 Therefore, the school's
nondiscrimination policy merely needed to be reasonable and viewpoint
neutral to pass constitutional muster.28 9 The nondiscrimination policy was
reasonable because the purpose of the school's student organization
program was "to promot[e] diversity and nondiscrimination,"2 9 0 and the
fraternity and sorority had alternative avenues of communication besides
the forum from which they had been excluded.29 ' The nondiscrimination
policy was facially viewpoint neutral because the policy's purpose was not to
suppress a particular viewpoint but rather to "remove access barriers
imposed against groups that have historically been excluded." 292 The school
still allowed the fraternity and sorority to express their message and exclude
anyone from membership. 293 The school simply denied them the privileges

287. Id. at 795, 798. "We see no material distinction between San Diego State's student
organization program and the student organization program discussed in Christian Legal
Society ..... Id. at 797.
288. Id. at 798.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 799.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 801. Earlier that year, a district court within the Ninth circuit decided a case
that was similar to Reed, but it did not involve the public fora doctrine. In Apilado v. North
American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, three heterosexuals were disqualified from
competing in the Gay Softball World Series because the game's rules only allowed '"a
maximum of two Heterosexual players'" per team. Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic
Alliance, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (quoting Dkt. No. 34 Ex. 2, Apilado,
792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (No. C1O-0682)). Although the district court held that the homosexual
sports club was a public accommodation under the state's nondiscrimination law, the court
also held that there was no "compelling state interest in allowing heterosexuals to play gay
softball" that also overrode the burden on the homosexual sports club's expressive
association. Id. at 1160, 1163. "It would be difficult for the NAGAAA[,the homosexual sports
club,] to effectively emphasize a vision of the gay lifestyle rooted in athleticism, competition
and sportsmanship if it were prohibited from maintaining a gay identity." Id. at 1162.
Therefore the homosexual sports club could place a cap on heterosexual membership so that
it could preserve its expressive message. Id.
293. Reed, 648 F.3d at 803.
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of official recognition.294 Therefore, the school's nondiscrimination policy
was facially valid.295
5.

Eleventh Circuit

A district court within the Eleventh Circuit also agrees with the Ninth
Circuit.29 6 In Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen,297 the University of Florida denied
a Christian fraternity2 98 official recognition.2 99 The school claimed that the
fraternity's "requirement that its members believe in Jesus Christ is a
violation of UF's Nondiscrimination Policy because it discriminates against

294. Id. The benefits of official recognition included "university funding, use of San
Diego State's name and logo, access to campus office space and meeting rooms, free publicity
in school publications, and participation in various special university events." Id. at 795.
295. Id. at 805. Despite these grim results for the fraternity and sorority, the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to the trial court to determine if it had exempted certain groups
from the policy while not granting such an exemption to Plaintiffs. Id.
296. See Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2008),
vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter at the Univ. of
Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2009). The appeals court vacated the district court's
order denying the Christian fraternity's motion for a preliminary injunction because the
school amended its policy to accommodate the fraternity. Id. at 918. It then remanded the
case for dismissal. Id. at 915, 918. Nevertheless, the fact that the appeals court never
addressed the merits of the fraternity's claims means that district courts within the Eleventh
Circuit may still rely on this case and even Martinez to compel groups to associate with
outsiders.
297. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
298. The Christian fraternity was known as Beta Upsilon Chi, Upsilon Chapter,
(hereinafter "BYX"), which is "the nation's largest Christian fraternity" Id. at 1276. BYX
required students to go through a pledge process to be inducted as members. Id.
The purpose of the pledge process is to examine the applicants' understanding
of salvation, their personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and their willingness
to adhere to guidelines of and work toward fulfilling the purpose of BYX.
During the interview segment of the pledge process, the applicants are asked
questions about their Christian experience, Christian beliefs and willingness to
adhere to the organization's Statement of Faith and to conform with the
organization's Code of Conduct.
Id.
299. Id. at 1277. Like Martinez, and even Healy, the benefits of being an officially
recognized student organization at the University of Florida were "priority use of facilities on
campus, eligibility to seek University funding, having access to bulletin boards in high traffic
areas of campus, appearing in student organization lists in UF publications, and having a
university-sponsored website and email address." Id.
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non-Christians on the basis of religious belief or creed.""o The trial court
used Dale as a model for analyzing this case and found that the fraternity
engaged in expressive association.301 Nevertheless, unlike the Supreme
Court's decision in Dale, the court did not believe that the school's
nondiscrimination policy materially burdened the fraternity, even if it
coerced the fraternity into opening their membership to non-Christians.30 2
In fact, the court believed that this case was distinguishable from Dale.303
Purportedly, the difference was that in Dale the Boy Scouts barred an
activist from membership who spoke out against the Boy Scouts's values,
but, here, the fraternity at the school attempted to bar students from
membership solely because they were non-Christians."* The trial court also
contended that the school's rejection of the fraternity was motivated by
nonideological reasons because other religious fraternities gained official
recognition by adhering to the school's nondiscrimination policy. 05
Therefore, the school's nondiscrimination policy amounted to regulation of
conduct and not belief or expression.0 '
III. PROBLEM

The ideals of inclusiveness within a group, regardless of a person's race,
gender, religion, or other characteristics of status that nondiscrimination
policies strive for are generally admirable. Although, in the abstract, there is
nothing wrong with the ideals behind a nondiscrimination policy, a
governing entity can use a nondiscrimination policy to discourage an
individual's legitimate exercise of constitutional rights. The Constitution
guarantees the right of every individual to believe what he wishes to believe

300. Id. The school's nondiscrimination policy "require[d] that all student organizations
state in their organizational constitutions that they will not discriminate on the basis of race,
creed, color, sex, age, national origin, or disability." Id.
301. Id. at 1278.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1279 n.2.
304. Id. The court found that "BYX has failed to show that the forced inclusion of a nonChristian in their group meetings or other functions will prevent BYX from encouraging
their Christian members in their faith, fostering unity with like-minded Christians, and
teaching Christian leadership. Id. at 1278.
305. Id. at 1279-80.
306. Id.
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and to associate with others who hold those beliefs without government
interference." 7
A. ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez: A Trojan Horsefor the Diminution
ofAssociationalFreedom
1. Martinez Downgrades Some Expressive Association Claims from
Strict Scrutiny to a Lesser Level of Scrutiny
Prior to Martinez, the government could only infringe on a group's
expressive association if it withstood a form of strict scrutiny review by
showing a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored.3 08 This rule
applied regardless of the forum of the expressive activity.o' Nevertheless,
Martinez modified the rule. Now, in the context of a limited public forum, if
a claimant brings a free speech claim and an expressive association claim,
both claims merge and are analyzed under a public fora analysis.1 o
Although Martinez only addressed this in a limited public forum,' it is
likely that the Martinez rule will extend to other public fora in future cases.
Naturally, a claimant would desire to argue alternative theories to win his
case. Given that speech and expressive association are related claims, an
infringement on expressive association can also be an infringement on
speech because the forced inclusion of a nonmember into an association
may alter its speech. For example, it is logical to extend this rule to a
nonpublic forum where the claimant brings an identical claim to Martinez.
If this prophecy is fulfilled, government regulation of expressive activity in
both a traditional public forum and a designated public forum will remain
subject to strict scrutiny, but government regulation of expressive activity
will only be subject to a lesser level of scrutiny in a limited or nonpublic
forum based on prior precedent.
One way around the Martinez rule is to allege an expressive association
claim without alleging an additional free speech claim, elevating the
standard of review to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that future
courts will allow a claimant to utilize this strategy to avoid the Martinez rule
because freedom of association is especially implied from and is similar to
307. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
308. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
309. See id. at 622; Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010).
310. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86.
311. Id. at 2986.
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the freedom of speech as well as other rights in the First Amendment. 312
Both speech and expressive association are similar activities.313 The only
significant difference is that expressive association involves the right to
form groups to express certain ideas, which includes the right to exclude
individuals from the group who threaten to alter its message.314 In fact, the
Court stated in dicta that "the same considerations that have led us to apply
a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums as
compared to other environments apply with equal force to expressive
association occurring in limited public forums."31 5 Therefore, it should
come as no surprise if, in a subsequent case, the Court begins to analyze
exclusively freedom of association cases under a public fora doctrine.
2. Martinez Allows the Regulation of Viewpoint Under the Premise of
Regulating Conduct
The Court's primary justification for forcing a group to accept members
that it does not desire is that they are merely regulating conduct and not the
group's viewpoint.316 The Court assumes that an association's members are
still free to promote their ideas, even if they must accept a nonmember. The
problem is that this decision opens the door for the government to regulate
conduct as a pretext for discriminating against a group's viewpoint.317

312. See id. at 2985. Even before Martinez, some courts have refused to recognize a
substantive difference between a freedom of speech claim and freedom of association claim
brought by the same party. Illiano v. Mineola Union Free Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 2d 341, 355
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Expressive association claims, such as the Plaintiffs claim that she was
retaliated against for associating with Jews, are considered to be the equivalent of free speech
claims .... [T]he plaintiffs freedom of association claim is duplicative of her inviable
freedom of speech claim." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Econ. Opportunity Comm'n
v. Cnty. of Nassau, 106 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a nonprofit
community organization failed establish that a municipality compelled it to associate with an
general contractor) ("Expressive association claims, such as the Plaintiffs' claims that they
have been retaliated against for their associations with minority groups and the poor, are
considered to be the equivalent of free speech claims, since the expressive conduct alleged is
inextricably linked to protected speech."); Birmingham v. Ogden, 70 F. Supp. 2d 353, 368-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Expressive association is considered a form of 'speech,' in the way that
certain expressive conduct has been held to constitute speech.").
313. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
314. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
315. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (citations omitted).
316. Id. at 2988, 2991, 2994.
317. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Martinez ignores the prior case of Healy, where the Court held that a
university cannot deny a student club official recognition solely because it
disagrees with the club's philosophy."' The facts of Healy are nearly on
point with the facts of Martinez. Like the Christian Legal Society in
Martinez, the Students for a Democratic Society in Healy were "denied the
use of campus facilities, as well as access to the customary means used for
communication among the members of the college community."3 19 The
only significant distinction between Healy and Martinez is the group's
identity: discrimination against a group that advocated a philosophy of
violence, compared to discrimination against a harmless religious group.320
Essentially, Martinez signals a reversal of the Court's holding in Healy,
where the Court chose to refrain from regulating viewpoint. Now the
government can regulate viewpoint, as long as it can construe the viewpoint
as conduct.
B. The Circuit Courts: The Problem Persists
Martinez's failure to address the relationship between nondiscrimination
policies and freedom of association technically leaves, at least on the
surface, the circuit courts split on this issue. The Seventh Circuit holds that
nondiscrimination policies cannot be used to exclude expressive
associations that discriminate based on membership.32' The Second Circuit,
Ninth Circuit, and a district court within the Eleventh Circuit allow state
entities to use their nondiscrimination policies to alter the core group
dynamics of associations that meet on government property that either
constitutes a limited or nonpublic forum.322 A district court within the

318. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972).
319. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 3008.
321. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
322. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012); Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d
839, 862 (2d Cir. 1996); Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (N.D. Fla.
2008), vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter at the
Univ. of Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2009); Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon PI
Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated by Chi Iota
Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007)
(vacating the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, which was issued on the
belief that the fraternity was likely to succeed on its claims regarding intimate association).

2014]

ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACY AS A REMEDY

559

Third Circuit would resolve this issue either way, depending on the facts of
the case at hand.32 3
Although the Second and Eleventh Circuit cases were decided before
Martinez, they follow a path of analysis that is similar to Martinez. It is true
that these circuits never directly applied a public fora analysis. Nevertheless,
they allow the regulation of viewpoint under the premise of regulating
conduct and they base their decisions on whether forced inclusion would
substantially alter the group's message. A closer reexamination of the
relevant cases from both of these circuits is warranted.
In the Second Circuit case of Hsu ex rel. Hsu,324 the court decided that the
state may force an after school religious club to accept outsiders as members
and allow them to run for all but three officer positions.32 5 The court
believed that only the president, vice president, and music coordinator
positions were essential to fostering the group's expressive religious
message and that forced inclusion in other aspects would not harm the
group.36 The Second Circuit case of Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon PI
Fraternity27 reached a similar result because the court did not believe that
male solidarity justified excluding women from an all-male Jewish club.32 8
Essentially, the court believed the status of being a male was unrelated to the
expression of Jewish culture.329 The Second Circuit case of Boy Scouts of
America v. Wyman33 o allows a government entity to use its
nondiscrimination policy to exclude expressive groups from participating in
government sponsored charity campaigns.' Here, the court believed that
the government may justly use its nondiscrimination policy to exclude the
Boys Scouts from access to a nonpublic forum because the Boy Scouts did
not allow homosexuals to become members of their group.332

323. See Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 851 F. Supp. 2d 936, 958
(E.D. Pa. 2012).
324. Hsu ex rel. Hsu, 85 F.3d 839.
325. Id. at 857-58.
326. Id.
327. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon PIFraternity,443 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
328. Id. at 393.
329. Id.
330. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003).
331. Id. at 84-85.
332. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit case of Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen3 3 also
permitted a state university to regulate belief, under the premise of
regulating conduct. There, the trial court believed that a university's
nondiscrimination policy only regulated conduct because several student
religious organizations gained official recognition by adhering to the
policy."' Therefore, it was permissible to deny a Christian student
organization official recognition because they excluded non-Christians."'
Like the Martinez case, in each of these cases, the courts believed that
they were regulating conduct rather than the group's beliefs. Although the
plaintiffs in each of these cases contended otherwise, the courts chose to
question the clubs' sincerely held beliefs and expressions. The courts have
failed to recognize that "the particular conduct at issue here constitutes a
form of expression that is protected by the First Amendment."33 6 When the
government does not allow expressive associations, such as religious,
cultural, or philosophical groups to express their beliefs because they limit
their membership to those who share those beliefs, the government engages
in viewpoint discrimination.
Regarding the Seventh Circuit case of ChristianLegal Society v. Walker,3
it resolved before Martinez's fateful decision.3 ' Although the Seventh
Circuit may decline to extend the Martinez rule to future cases on
nondiscrimination policies, the circuit may find that the difference between
an all-comers policy and nondiscrimination policy is de minimis enough to
warrant an extension of the Martinez rule. In fact, this was the view held by

333. Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Fla. 2008), vacated as moot
and remanded sub nom. Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter at the Univ. of Fla. v. Machen,
586 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2009).
334. Id. at 1279-80.
335. Id. at 1279.
336. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3011 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
337. Id. The freedom to form and express beliefs is an essential right of every American
citizen.
It is through speech that our convictions and beliefs are influenced, expressed,
and tested. It is through speech that we bring those beliefs to bear on
Government and on society. It is through speech that our personalities are
formed and expressed. The citizen is entitled to seek out or reject certain ideas
or influences without Government interference or control.
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000).
338. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
339. Compare Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2971, with Walker, 453 F.3d at 853.
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the Ninth Circuit in Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reedme when it
extended the Martinez rule to nondiscrimination polices.' "[W]hen a
university excludes a student organization from official recognition for
refusing to comply with the school's nondiscriminationpolicy, both freedom
of speech and freedom of expressive association challenges are properly
analyzed under the limited-public-forum doctrine.""
After examining where circuit courts stand both before and after
Martinez, the future of a person's right to associate looks grim. Overruling
Martinez would benefit liberty because freedom of association cases would
be decided under the Roberts framework. Nevertheless, this raises another
issue because the Roberts framework leaves much to be desired.
C. A Return to the Roberts Framework Is Inadequate
Although Roberts announced a framework for addressing freedom of
association cases, this framework opened the door for a diminution of
associational rights, compared to its prior cases. The Roberts limitation
effectively deprived individuals who did not fall within intimate association
of an extra layer of constitutional protection, even if those individuals had a
claim to expressive association." Although Roberts indicated that
expressive association claims were subject to strict scrutiny,3 " the courts do
not always apply that standard in freedom of association cases, in part,
because Roberts also indicates that these claims should be subject to a
balancing test." Even in Dale, which was a triumph for the Boy Scouts, the
Court still clung to Roberts's implied balancing test regarding expressive
association.3" This test examines whether "the state law would impose any
'serious burden' on the organization's rights of expressive association. So in
these cases, the associational interest in freedom of expression has been set
on one side of the scale, and the State's interest on the other." 7 The
problem with this is that it allows courts to apply an arbitrary standard. In
340. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
341. Id.
342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. Inazu, supra note 13, at 559 n.572.
344. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (giving standard of review for
expressive association); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 587 (2013).
345. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
346. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 658-59 (2000).
347. Id. at 658.
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Dale, the Court was split five to four on whether coercing the Boy Scouts to
admit a homosexual scoutmaster would impose a serious burden on the
Boy Scouts's expressive association."" Although the Boy Scouts blunted the
plaintiffs assault on their freedom in Dale, it appears that the courts are
willing to question the sincerity of an association's core beliefs.
Another problem is that the Roberts standard of review for expressive
association departs from the traditional strict scrutiny test itself, which
indicates a lesser level of scrutiny." 9 Regarding expressive association, the
Court held that "[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms."350 The traditional strict scrutiny
test is that the government action must achieve a compelling state interest
and be narrowly tailored in the least restrictive means and not significantly
less restrictive means.351 In fact, some courts have interpreted this standard
to be lower than strict scrutiny.35 2 For example, in the Second Circuit case of

348. Id. at 642.
349. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling "Well-Settled" Law of Freedom of Association, 43
CONN. L. REV. 149, 175 (2010).
350. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added).
351. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 816 (2000) (holding
that a content-based restriction on the transmission hours of sexually oriented programming
failed strict scrutiny's narrowly tailoring requirement). The traditional strict scrutiny
requirement is a very high standard.
Strict scrutiny varies from ordinary scrutiny by imposing three hurdles on the
government. It shifts the burden of proof to the government; requires the
government to pursue a "compelling state interest;" and demands that the
regulation promoting the compelling interest be "narrowly tailored."
Strict scrutiny's "narrow tailoring" requirement provides a means to
examine the government's "precision of regulation," allowing the Court to
uphold government action "only if ... it is necessary to achieve... [the]
compelling interest" that the government has asserted as the purpose of its
action. Narrow tailoring demands that the fit between the government's action
and its asserted purpose be "as perfect as practicable." Strict scrutiny's narrow
tailoring requirement means that legislation must be neither overinclusive nor
underinclusive.
Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM.
J.LEGAL HisT. 355, 359-61 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
352. See Inazu, supra note 349, at 176 n.143.
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Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon PI Fraternity,3 the court relied on this
lesser level of scrutiny to hold that a state university may compel an all-male
Jewish fraternity to accept female members.354 "The mere fact that the
associational interest asserted is recognized by the First Amendment does
not necessarily mean that a regulation which burdens that interest must
satisfy strict scrutiny."355 Therefore, even if the Court were to abandon the
Martinez rule as it pertains to freedom of association and speech in limited
public fora, the Roberts standard still fails to provide the full amount of
protections to which associations, especially private ones, are entitled under
the First Amendment.
More crucial than the inconsistency and arbitrariness of the Roberts
standard of review is that what is missing from the Roberts framework-i.e.,
intimate and expressive association-is a separate associational privacy
analysis."' Specifically, the Roberts framework ignores prior case law, which
makes clear that "'freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations' ... [is] a peripheral First Amendment right.""' Instead,
Roberts limits associational privacy to a subset of intimate association.3 58
This implies that small intimate groups are entitled to privacy within their
associations, but large expressive groups are generally not entitled to the
353. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136
(2d Cir. 2007).
354. Id. at 139.
355. Id.
356. Although the post Roberts Court has never articulated a separate associational
privacy analysis, the concept is implied within the post-Roberts opinions. N.Y. State Club
Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court "assumes for purposes of its analysis, but does not hold, the existence of a
constitutional right of private association for other than expressive or religious purposes");
see Allen, supra note 36, at 910.
Private associations are entitled by the First Amendment to segregate
themselves in exclusive physical domains, hold secrets, confidences, and
embrace viewpoints and messages that may be offensive to others. Government
cannot tell us whom or what to like. First Amendment associational privacy
cases, like Fourteenth Amendment decisional privacy cases, trade, for better
and for worse, on the notion that privacy "amounts to the state of the agent
having control over decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and
value from the agent's love, caring, or liking."
Id. at 913.
357. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
358. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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same level of protection."' Nevertheless, there are a few narrow instances
where courts may ignore the Roberts framework and still follow the
Patterson approach by applying an associational privacy analysis to
expressive groups. 3 60 The seminal example is when the government
36
attempts to compel groups to disclose internal information. 1 In contrast,
courts that have addressed associational privacy outside of the Patterson
context tend to analyze it under the intimate association prong of the
Roberts framework.3 62 Therefore, when it comes to coercing groups to
359. Id.
360. Compare DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 827-29 (1966) (holding
that a court that jailed a private person for refusing to answer questions pertaining to his
prior association with communist groups violated the First Amendment's protection of
associational privacy), and Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466 ("[Tlhe immunity from state scrutiny
of membership lists ... is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."), with In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales
Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 481 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying a Patterson associational privacy
analysis and holding that a court's discovery order that compelled the disclosure of a trade
group's prelobbying communications violated the trade group's right to associate), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004 (2012), and Guthrey v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 1:10-CV-02177AWI, 2012 WL 2499938, at *9-11 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (holding that a discovery request
violated a party's right to privacy in his religious associations under the First Amendment).
361. Patterson,357 U.S. at 462; In re Motor Fuel, 641 F.3d at 479-80.
362. See Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
("[Tlhe freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Such relationships may take
various forms, including the most intimate."); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441-42 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that intimate association includes
private relationships and that a university fraternity that averaged between twenty and eighty
members did not constitute an intimate association); Louisiana Debating & Literary Ass'n v.
City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The right of private association
protects the choice of individuals and organizations 'to enter into and maintain certain
intimate human relationships ... against undue intrusion by the State....' (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18)); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that familial association, which at its core includes a privacy right, is a subset of
intimate association); Payne v. Fontenot, 925 F. Supp. 414, 419 (M.D. La. 1995)
(characterizing intimate association as a form of "private association [that] is protected not
by the First Amendment, but by the fundamental right of privacy emanating from the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment"); Able v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 112, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(relying on Roberts to hold that intimate association is related to a right to privacy and is a
separate claim from expressive association); Christy v. Servitto, 699 F. Supp. 618, 656 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) ("[T]he right to associate consists of two components: the freedom of private
association which is a fundamental element of personal liberty under the (F]ourteenth
[A]mendment, and the freedom of expressive association under the [F]irst [A]mendment.").
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accept members whom they do not want, an associational privacy analysis is
lacking in the post-Roberts freedom of association cases.
IV. SOLUTION: A MODIFIED ROBERTS FRAMEWORK

A. The Justificationfor Findingan Implied Right to AssociationalPrivacy
In the early years, when the boundaries of the right to associate were in
their infancy, the Court recognized that the First Amendment "imposes
limitations upon govermental [sic] abridgment of 'freedom to associate and
privacy in one's associations."'363Although other provisions in the Bill of
Rights,3 6 especially the Fourth Amendment, 6 ' address a right to privacy
from government intrusion, no particular amendment can be translated
into a general right to privacy.3* Rather certain amendments protect
particular venues of privacy. 6' The concept of privacy is essentially the
"right of the individual to be let alone." 68 It is true that the terms association
and privacy are not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights or even the
Fourteenth Amendment, but, as will be shown, they are implied.

363. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at
462).
364. To some extent, the Third Amendment concerns a right to privacy because it
prevents the government from quartering soldiers in homes during peace time. Id. The Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, in part, concerns "the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.'" Id. (quoting Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
365. The Fourth Amendment guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy against the
government for unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring);
see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001).
366. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
367. Id.
368. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890); See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Id.
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote that unlike a legal code, which specifies
precisely the actions that the government or individuals are forbidden from
taking, the Constitution is a framework.369 A framework does not require
precision, but only that "its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects,
be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.""' This means that
when interpreting the Constitution's provisions, especially the Bill of
Rights, it is important "to effectuate their purposes-to lend them meanings
that ensure that the liberties the Framers sought to protect are not
undermined by the changing activities of government officials."37 1 This
technique involves using the Constitution's framework to "identify a
fundamental human liberty that should be shielded forever from
government intrusion. "372
The First Amendment's specific purpose is to shield private citizens from
government intrusions into their freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
and freedom of the press and to protect their right to peaceably assemble
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.3 73 Nevertheless,
the First Amendment is silent about government rules pertaining to
expressive behaviors that do not fall squarely within the purview of free
speech, religion, peaceful assembly, etc. 7 ' Therefore, "to give effect to the
purpose of the Amendment, we have applied it to regulations of conduct
designed to convey a message ....
The application of the First Amendment's specific provisions, imply a
broader purpose to protect certain fundamental rights that are incidental to
the application of its enumerated provisions. For example, the First
Amendment implies a right to believe.3 76 The right to associate is analogous

369. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.").

370. Id.
371. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 187 (1984).
372. Id. at 186.
373. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment says: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
374. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187 n.5.
375. Id.
376. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). "Thus the [First] Amendment
embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
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to the right to believe because it "is more than the right to attend a meeting;
it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means.""'
Implied rights, such as the right to associate and the right to privacy within
those associations are an extension of "expression of opinion; and while it is
not expressly included in the First Amendment[, its existence is necessary
in making the express guarantees fully meaningful."" In fact there is a
corollary right of privacy in holding beliefs and sharing those beliefs within
a person's associations.37 9 "In other words, the First Amendment privilege
generally guarantees the right to maintain private associations when,
without that privacy, there is a chance that there may be no association and,
consequently, no expression of the ideas that association helps to foster."so
Therefore, an examination of the First Amendment justifies finding an
implied right to associational privacy within the First Amendment, which
"creates an area into which the Government may not enter."381
The next step is to address whether there is an implied right to
associational privacy in nonexpressive behavior that falls outside the
boundaries of the First Amendment. If there is an implied right to
associational privacy in nonexpressive behavior, it is found in the
Fourteenth Amendment.382 The Court in Pattersonheld that "[ilt is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces the freedom of
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society." Id. at 303-04.
377. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
378. Id. at 483.
379. William 0. Douglas, The Right ofAssociation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1963).
380. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 479 (10th Cir.
2011).
381. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570 (1963) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
382. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Fourteenth
Amendment, in relevant part, says:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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speech.""' Even in the Roberts case, the Court implied a right to
associational privacy, but, unlike the previous cases, it limited the right to
intimate association.384 Nevertheless, the freedom of association is worthless
without linking it to a right to privacy to curtail government intrusions into
all associations and not merely intimate ones. This right of associational
privacy is fundamental and goes deeper than a First Amendment analysis of
this issue. It is found in the Fourteenth Amendment and within the
structure of the Constitution itself.
Many cases decided under a Fourteenth Amendment theory address
fundamental rights.385 When the Court finds a fundamental right, it is
recognized as "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'" and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 3 87 The Patterson Court
recognized that all liberty would be in jeopardy without the freedom to

383. Patterson,357 U.S. at 460.
384. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984); see also Inazu, supra note
13, at 558-59.
385. See MASSEY, supra note 102, at 743-44. A Tenth Circuit case gives an excellent
summary of the primary protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment embodies three different protections: (1) a
procedural due process protection requiring the state to provide individuals
with some type of process before depriving them of their life, liberty, or
property; (2) a substantive due process protection, which protects individuals
from arbitrary acts that deprive them of life, liberty, or property; and (3) an
incorporation of specific protections afforded by the Bill of Rights against the
states.
Miller v. Campbell Cnty., 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir. 1991).
386. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
387. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). The philosopher,
John Locke, writes:
[T]he end of the law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge
freedom; for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no
law, there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence
from others, which cannot be where there is not law; but freedom is not, as we
are told: a liberty for every man to do what he lists-for who could be free,
when every other man's humor might domineer over him?--but a liberty to
dispose and order as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and his whole
property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not
to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
JoHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. VI, § 57 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,

Prentice-Hall Inc. 1997) (1690).
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associate with others and the right to keep the government out of those
associations."" The government would have unlimited discretion to inquire
into the private lives of citizens and to dictate with whom they can or
cannot associate.
Fundamental rights also were recognized at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution.?" The Federalist papers are essential to interpreting the
role of the Constitution as it relates to fundamental rights. Although the
right to privacy, especially associational privacy, is not explicitly expounded
on in the Federalist papers, it is implied, 90 particularly in Alexander
Hamilton's writings. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton discusses the role of the
judiciary under the proposed constitution.3 91 "[T]he independence of the
judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury
of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial
laws."3 92 Hamilton foresaw that the new national government, specifically
the legislature, would be tempted to pass laws that infringed on the
fundamental rights of citizens.3 Therefore, one of the functions of the
judiciary was to act as a check against the legislative branch.3 94
It is true one of the reasons why the Bill of Rights was passed was to
protect fundamental rights.3 95 Nevertheless, in Federalist No. 84, Hamilton
declared that "[t]he truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that
the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.""' This is why the Federalists, including

388. Patterson,357 U.S. at 460.
389. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. "We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit
of Happiness ..... THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
390. See Anita L. Allen, ConstitutionalLaw and Privacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 146-47 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010).
391. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
392. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See Darien A. McWhirter & Jon D. Bible, PRIVACY AS ACONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 2, 61
(1992).
396. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
Hamilton further justifies why the Constitution is itself a bill of rights:
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Hamilton, asserted that a separate Bill of Rights was not necessary because
the Constitution limits the government so that it does not have jurisdiction
over what is not enumerated to its respective branches.' Hamilton writes
that, "a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a
Constitution . .. which is merely intended to regulate the general political

interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of
every species of personal and private concerns."398 Therefore, in the views of
the Federalists, there was no reason to pass the First Amendment because
the new government had no powers over the freedoms of religion, speech,
peaceful assembly, etc.399 The problem with listing certain fundamental
rights in a bill of rights is that it may instill the dangerous idea that
fundamental rights that are not listed are not protected under the
Constitution's framework."o This may give the government a pretext to
trample the rights of citizens,"' especially associational privacy, as it is seen
in the nondiscrimination cases.42
'WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.' Here is a better recognition of popular rights than
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our
State bills of rights and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics
than in a constitution of government."
Id. at 512 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
397. See id. at 513.
398. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 513.
Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes of
proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns? This we have
seen has also been attended to in a variety of cases in the same plan. Adverting
therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that
it is not to be found in the work of the convention.
Id. at 514-15 (emphasis added).
400. Id. at 513.
401. Id. Hamilton writes:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in
which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very account, would
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Id.
402. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012); Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d
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Therefore, there is an inherent and implied right of associational privacy,
with which the government should not interfere, absent a compelling
interest that is narrowly tailored in the least restrictive means. The postRoberts decisions have failed to give associational privacy adequate
protection. It is time for courts to modify their analysis to provide both
groups and individuals with the full protection that they are guaranteed
within their constitutional right to associate freely.
B. ProposedModification
Now that associational privacy has been justified both as an
indispensable element in the First Amendment's right to associate and as an
inherent fundamental right, it should be incorporated into the analysis of
future cases. This Comment does not propose to do away with the Roberts
framework but rather to add to its analysis. The courts should instead apply
a three-layer framework by asking whether the group claiming a right to
associate engages in intimate, expressive, or private association.403 The
advantage of associational privacy is that it adds another layer of protection.
Furthermore, an associational privacy analysis would protect groups that
have lacked protection under the traditional Roberts framework because
they did not fall under either the expressive or intimate classifications.
Given that associational privacy is a fundamental right that extends
beyond intimate associations to all forms of associations, the Court should
analyze associational privacy cases under traditional strict scrutiny." In
this approach, an infringement on associational privacy occurs when the
state interferes with the group's right to exclude persons from participating
in the group or demands that it disclose confidential information, such as
membership lists. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, any government
infringement on associational privacy is presumed invalid unless the
839 (2d Cir. 1996); Beta Upsilon Chi v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Fla. 2008),
vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter at the Univ. of
Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2009); Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon PI
Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) vacated by Chi Iota
Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (The
appeals court vacated the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, which it issued
on the belief that the fraternity was likely to succeed on its claims regarding intimate
association.).
403. As used in this Comment, private association is synonymous with associational
privacy.
404. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) ("[S]tate action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.").
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government can prove a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored
in the least restrictive means."s This approach eliminates the need for
courts to arbitrarily inquire into whether the government action imposes a
serious burden on the association because it presumes that any
infringement on associational privacy is invalid. This is a stronger standard
than Roberts, which departed from the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
It is important to examine what constitutes a compelling state interest. It
may include emergencies that threaten health and safety.o6 and diversity of
education within the classroom setting itself.o' To clarify the latter
suggested compelling interest, it should not apply outside the classroom
setting when a government entity, such as a state university, invites a
private student group or other groups to meet on its property. Roberts held
that the elimination of gender discrimination was a compelling state
interest.4 08 Nevertheless, this should be limited to the context of public
accommodations, employment, and the classroom setting because this was
the original purpose of federal and state civil rights laws.4 09 For example, it
405. See Siegel, supra note 351, at 359-60.
406. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (stating that the prevention of an imminent race prison riot is a
compelling state interest to temporarily segregate the inmates).
407. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that a "[law [s]chool has a
compelling state interest in attaining a diverse student body" through the admissions
process).
408. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
409. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-57 (2000). According to modern
jurisprudential thought, Congress has the power to enforce civil rights laws through its
power to regulate interstate commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964)
(holding that Congress had the power to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the
Commerce Clause). Alternatively, with respect to race, Congress has the power to enforce
civil rights laws through section two of the Thirteenth Amendment because Congress can
define racial discrimination as a "badge[] [or] incident[] of slavery." Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); MASSEY, supra note 102, at 1168-69; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII. Congress has the power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment against the
federal government, the states, and all private parties. Jones, 392 U.S. at 438; MASSEY, supra
note 102, at 1168-69; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Furthermore, with respect to race, but
also other issues beyond race such as gender, section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to remedy historical violations of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Causes. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 51819 (1997); MASSEY, supra note 102, at 1171. Nevertheless, Congress can only enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); MASSEY, supra note 102, at 1170. Section two of the
Fifteenth Amendment also grants Congress the power to remedy violations against the right
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would be odd for the state to assert that it has a compelling interest to
eliminate gender discrimination in a harmless Boy Scout troop and force it
to accept female members because it meets at a public high school. The key
point to this Comment is that when the government permits private groups
to meet on government property, the group's dynamics should be respected
so that they can be as selective or nonselective as they choose.410 "Private
organizations often pursue unpopular causes, which produces a great desire
to control them.""' Nevertheless, the structure of the Constitution erects a
barricade to create a zone of privacy within a person's associations that the
government generally may not enter.412
An associational privacy analysis resolves the assault on constitutional
liberties from government nondiscrimination policies because it returns to
the origins of freedom of association. For example, a university may no
longer force religious organizations to include nonreligious members under
the premise of regulating conduct, when instead, it is actually regulating
belief. The early cases on freedom of association recognized a right to
associate, which not only includes a right to share and espouse the same
beliefs, but also the right for persons to physically gather together in groups
and a right to privacy within those groups.4 13 "The associational rights
which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all
yellow[,] all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established.
Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must
be."414 If the government wishes to regulate the conduct of groups that it
to vote on account of race. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 326 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013) (Shelby
struck down a congressional formula pertaining to the Voting Rights Act); MASSEY, supra
note 102, at 1171. Congress can enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against both federal and
state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
410. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656-57.
411. Douglas, supra note 379, at 1375; see Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963) ("[W]here the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing
beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the deterrent and 'chilling' effect on the
free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association is
consequently the more immediate and substantial."); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where
a group espouses dissident beliefs.").
412. See Douglas,supra note 379, at 1376.
413. See Patterson,357 U.S. at 460.
414. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor also expressed a similar view. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New
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invites to meet on its property, it must overcome the proposed privacy
standard.
An associational privacy analysis also curtails a repeat of or further
expansion of the Martinez rule because associational privacy is much
broader than expressive association. The rationale in Martinez was that free
speech claims and expressive association claims were so similar that they
were functionally equivalent.4 1 s Then the Court applied a lesser level of
scrutiny under a limited public fora analysis."1 6 Although associational
privacy is related to expressive behavior, it also pertains to nonexpressive
behavior. This means a separate analysis of associational privacy is
warranted.
V. CONCLUSION

The right to associate has suffered serious setbacks. Although the early
cases that established the right to associate recognized that the privacy
within those associations was an essential element of liberty, later cases,
such as Roberts, drifted away from that philosophy. The floodgates were
opened. State government entities began to use their nondiscrimination
laws and policies in an attempt to force groups to include those they wished
to exclude. This especially manifested itself in the limited public fora
context. The United States Supreme Court has failed to resolve this issue
and the circuit courts remain split. Furthermore, if this issue were to reach
the Court, both the Martinez rule and the Roberts framework are
inadequate to vindicate the rights of associations. "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.""' Therefore, it is time for the Court to return to the origins of the
right to associate and recognize that there is an inherent right to privacy
within associations. Associational privacy is the shield that will protect

York, 487 U.S. 1, 19 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]here may well be organizations
whose expressive purposes would be substantially undermined if they were unable to confine
their membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background, or who
share some other such common bond. The associational rights of such organizations must be
respected.").
415. Christian Legal Soc'yv. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010).
416. Id. at 2986.
417. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
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groups from being coerced to include individuals whom they wish to
exclude.

